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Towards a theory 
of change 
Raúl Prebisch
With the present article the author rounds off the series he began 
with “A critique of peripheral capitalism” (published in Review No. 1), and 
continued with “Socio-economic structure and crisis of peripheral capitalism” 
(No. 6) and “The neoclassical theories of economic liberalism” (No. 7). 
While in all the preceding articles his main concern was to offer a critical 
interpretation of the functioning of peripheral capitalism and to show the 
inability of neoclassical theory to comprehend it in depth, in this one he seeks 
to trace the lines along which that system should be changed.
After recalling the basic features of his critique of how capitalism works 
in the periphery (chapter I), he sketches the criteria by which the process 
of change should be guided and which, in toto, constitute a synthesis 
of central values of socialism and liberalism (chapter II). He then goes 
on to pose certain inevitable questions as to the political conditions of 
change, through which he reaffirms the value of democracy as the ideal 
foundation for a harmonious society (chapter III). The next chapters (IV 
and V) are devoted to completing the presentation of his ideas via the 
analysis of problems of change linked to technique, demand, the structure 
of production, the specific features of peripheral capitalism, etc. In the final 
chapters he slightly shifts his angle of approach in order to deal, on the 
one hand, with the role of centre-periphery relations in change (chapter 
VI); and on the other hand, with the present crisis in the centres and its 
repercussions on the periphery (chapter VII); ending with a few reflections 
on ethics, rationality and foresight (chapter VIII).
His central ideas will give rise to controversy, not only because of 
their provenance, but also because they pivot upon the vexed questions 
of appropriation and social use of the surplus. But the writer is convinced 
that the present crisis will not be overcome with superficial measures; if it 
is to be surmounted and a developed, democratic and equitable society 
is to be built up, the process of change will have to strike at the very 
roots of the system.
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I think it desirable to begin this new article –the 
last lap in the difficult task I have set myself– with 
a summary of  the interpretation of  peripheral 
capitalism set forth in earlier papers. I invariably 
refer to Latin American capitalism as a whole, 
disregarding certain inter-country differences which, 
important though they are, do not invalidate the 
essential significance of that interpretation.
In this summary I have sought to answer some 
well-aimed criticisms directed at the first draft of 
the present article, as well as at those which have 
preceded it.1 I believe I have thus cleared the way for 
discussion of the outlines of a theory of change.
1. The fruits of technical progress and the 
flaws in the system
Peripheral capitalism is exclusive and conflictive: two 
major flaws which are aggravated by the centripetal 
character of capitalism in the developed countries, 
the inconsistency of its relations with the periphery 
and the effects of its hegemony.
The internal origin of  these defects is to be 
found in the mode of appropriation and distribution 
of  the fruits of  the increasing productivity that 
results from the penetration of  the technology of 
the centres into the heterogeneous social structure 
of the periphery, widely different from that of the 
centres themselves.
This process is dominated by the interplay of 
power relations.
The lion’s share of  the fruits in question is 
retained in the shape of a surplus in the upper strata 
of the social structure, thanks to the power accruing 
to them from the concentration of  the means of 
production in their hands.
1 Some of these criticisms and comments are published at the 
end of  the present article, while the remainder will appear in 
the next number of this Review. I have found them helpful and 
enlightening, and should like to express my gratitude to their 
authors. Furthermore, as always, Aníbal Pinto has given me 
the benefit of  his keenly perspicacious opinions. And Adolfo 
Gurrieri has lent his patient and intelligent collaboration by 
discussing the development of  my ideas with me and making 
highly positive suggestions.
This unequal distribution of income in favour 
of  the upper strata incites them to premature 
imitation of the consumption patterns of the centres, 
which, moreover, are by no means criticism. The 
privileged-consumer society which grows up in 
this way signifies a considerable waste of  capital 
accumulation potential, with which is combined the 
siphoning-off of income by the centres –especially 
through the transnational corporations–, thanks to 
their technical and economic superiority and their 
hegemonic power.
The consequent insufficiency of  capital 
accumulation, in respect of  both physical goods 
and education of human beings, and the explosive 
growth of the population, explain in essence why the 
system cannot intensively absorb the lower strata of 
the social structure. This constitutes the exclusive 
tendency of the system.
With the increasingly pervasive penetration of 
technique, structural changes supervene which are 
manifested in the formation of the middle strata, both 
in the sphere of the market and in that of the State.
2. Twofold pressure on the surplus
In the sphere of  the market, with the advance of 
the democratization process, the main body of the 
labour force acquires trade-union and political 
power, which enables it to secure a share in the 
surplus, either directly or through the social services 
provided by the State.
The State in its turn contends for a share in the 
surplus with a view to absorbing a steadily increasing 
proportion of  the labour force, chiefly from the 
traditional middle classes, which, like the other 
workers just mentioned, acquire trade-union and 
political power. Thanks to this last, the employment 
of  labour to expand State services, including the 
social services, is generally marked by a good deal 
of  spurious absorption of  manpower that is not 
really needed. The State taps part of the surplus in 
order to cope with this situation and to cover the 
purchase of goods and services in the market, in the 
fulfilment of its functions.
Part one
I
The dynamics of peripheral capitalism
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As a result of  this twofold pressure on the 
surplus from the sphere of the market and from that 
of the State, imitation of the consumption patterns 
of the centres is gradually extended to the middle 
strata, although much less intensively than in the 
case of the upper strata.
Thus, income distribution basically results 
from a changing interplay of  power relations, as 
alterations take place in the social structure with 
the march of technical progress.
3. The dynamic mechanism of the system
Thanks to the surplus and to the capital accumulation 
permitted by the system largely to meet the consumer 
requirements of the upper strata, these latter control 
the dynamic mechanism of the system. The system 
operates regularly as long as the surplus continues 
to be enlarged by successive productivity increments, 
despite the twofold pressure for shares in it.
These pressures are governed by no regulatory 
norm whatever, so that if  they become intense, they 
compress the surplus to such an extent that in the 
end accumulation suffers, and so does the evolution 
of  the privileged-consumer society. It is then that 
the conflictive phenomena of the system supervenes. 
Enterprises react by raising prices in order to re-
establish the dynamic of  the surplus, and this is 
followed by a counter-reaction on the part of  the 
labour force, provided it has sufficient power, with 
the consequent wage increases. Thus an inflationary 
spiral is triggered off: a new type of social inflation 
which is superimposed upon and aggravates the 
effects of other factors.
This is how the crisis of the system begins in the 
later stages of development, when the play of power 
relations gains great momentum with the unrestricted 
advance of the democratization process.
The tendency to this type of  crisis does not 
arise, of  course, in countries where the social 
structure is unfavourable to democratization or 
where the changes in this structure make for a 
democracy in form rather than in substance.
4. The structural surplus
The first thing to recall is the structural significance 
of the surplus. If  the fruits of technical progress are 
concentrated in the upper strata, this is because most 
of the workers whom capital accumulation makes 
it possible to employ do not succeed in pushing 
up their wages correlatively with their increasing 
productivity. The explanation lies in the regressive 
competition of  the labour which stays in lower-
productivity layers of technology, or is unemployed. 
All that happens is that a part of  the fruits of 
technique is transferred to the limited proportion of 
the labour force which, mainly by virtue of its social 
power, has been able to acquire the ever-greater skills 
demanded by the new techniques.
The surplus does not peter out as a result 
of  inter-enterprise competition, but is retained, 
circulates and increases because of the expansion of 
demand which, given the nature of the production 
process and its monetary requirements, precedes the 
appearance of the final products. This anticipatory 
expansion of demand prevents prices from falling 
as productivity rises.
The social inequality inherent in peripheral 
capitalism has its roots in the mode of appropriation 
of the surplus, without which the system could not 
function, since the privileged-consumer society –its 
outstanding manifestation– has, as we have seen, a 
peculiar dynamic of its own. Its ceaseless imitation of 
the patterns of consumption of the centres and the 
corresponding capital accumulation can be achieved 
only by virtue of the growth of the surplus.
If  the twofold participation in the surplus 
referred to above has positive effects in certain 
phases of  development, it ultimately comes up 
against the resistance of  the privileged-consumer 
society, which jibs at conceding shares in the surplus 
beyond a certain limit; and this is the starting-point 
of the crisis.
The dynamic in question does not admit of 
superficial rectifications. Rather do the serious 
problems it poses call for another and substantially 
different dynamic. They call for the transformation 
of the system.
What can explain why the twofold participation 
in the surplus cannot be carried beyond this critical 
limit? Why should it not be possible for the income 
of  the labour force to grow at the expense of 
privileged consumption? The reply is categorical. It 
cannot do so without detriment to the dynamics of 
the system; and this is precisely what happens.
The fact is that if  the sharing-out of  the 
surplus proceeds beyond the critical limit, not only 
is privileged consumption compressed but also 
the capital accumulation largely earmarked for 
its satisfaction. And there is no mechanism in the 
system to offset the diminution of this latter. The 
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twofold participation of  the labour force in the 
market sphere and of the State is not accompanied 
by an accumulation process to replace that of the 
privileged strata. At best, any such accumulation 
would be consumptive, not reproductive. Accordingly, 
accumulation is adversely affected, and so is the 
growth of the surplus deriving therefrom.
Nothing is farther from the intentions of the 
upper income strata than to change the system. 
Their reaction is quite different: they will do all 
they can to revive the growth of the surplus, thus 
launching the inflationary spiral, which gains 
considerable impetus if  and when the lower strata 
join in the struggle for participation.
. Trade-union and State responsibility
When the crisis of  the system enters upon and 
pursues its course, emphasis is usually placed on 
the responsibility of  the trade unions. But very 
important too, and sometimes paramount, is the 
responsibility of  the State, when it increases its 
share in the surplus without due regard to economic 
viability. The reason for this lies not only in the 
political pressure exerted by the labour force to 
obtain social advantages, but also in the State’s own 
dynamic, which leads it continually to expand its 
services and its absorption of  personnel (military 
expenditure included.)
Fiscal orthodoxy gradually becomes ineffectual 
as these forms of State participation are intensified. In 
reality, even if the hypertrophic growth of expenditure 
is covered by taxation, as the critical limit of  the 
system is approached, and still more so if this limit 
has already been passed, the taxes in question become 
largely inflationary when in one way or another they 
affect the labour force and this latter has enough 
power to recoup itself by means of pay increases.
Ideas applicable to outdated situations still persist. 
In the early phases of development trade-union power 
is non-existent or very slight; and the labour force is 
incapable of defending itself against the tax burden 
it is called upon to bear. In such conditions, the 
dominant political power of the upper strata enables 
them largely to evade their own tax responsibilities as 
a way of safeguarding the surplus.
Taxes are not inflationary in this case. And if  
inflation then occurs, it is because they are not being 
brought into service to cover excess expenditure. In 
these circumstances the rules of the game are very 
clear-cut: to increase taxation in so far as expenditure 
cannot be restricted. This is the golden age of fiscal 
and also monetary orthodoxy.
6. The use of force
Private appropriation of  the surplus is arbitrary. 
So is the struggle to share in it. The greater the 
power enjoyed, the bigger the share obtained; and 
this arbitrariness is aggravated as the inflationary 
spiral pursues its course. The intent to re-establish 
the dynamics of the surplus by raising prices proves 
a mirage, inasmuch as the counter-reaction of 
the labour force immediately ensues. Accordingly, 
accumulation and the formation of new surpluses 
–that is, the very stuff of redistribution– is adversely 
affected. And when these effects are produced they 
weaken the system’s capacity to absorb the increase 
in the labour force and the manpower vegetating in 
the lower layers of technology.
The political power of  the upper strata, 
which seemed to be declining with the march of 
democratization, once again bursts on to the scene, and 
the next step is the use of force, which makes it possible 
to break down the trade-union and political power of 
the disadvantaged strata, so that the dynamics of the 
surplus may be successfully re-established.
Let me recall what I have already said in another 
paper2 with respect to the productivity increment 
resulting from the lavish exploitation of certain non-
renewable natural resources. In this case the surplus 
can continue to increase, and nothing untoward will 
occur, despite the intensity of the twofold pressure for 
shares in it. The crisis of the system is accordingly 
deferred, but not indefinitely.
It is important to stress that when the power 
of  the upper strata is predominant in the social 
structure, the trade-union and political power of the 
labour force is inadequate or nonexistent, and the 
State keeps its expenditure within moderate limits, 
development crisis are of a different kind.
In the more advanced stages of development, 
if  the holders of military power are not necessarily 
under the dominion of the economic and political 
power of  the upper strata, one is tempted to ask 
why they intervene to serve the privileged-consumer 
society. Here undoubtedly a complex set of factors 
comes into play. But the fundamental explanation 
lies, in my opinion, in the fact that given the nature 
2 “Biosfera y Desarrollo”, a report presented at the Seminar on 
Development Styles and Environment, cepal/unep, Santiago, 
Chile, November 1979.
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of the system no other criteria for getting it back 
into working order are available. For, as has already 
been remarked, its dynamic mechanism, namely, the 
capacity for capital accumulation, without which no 
impetus could be given to development, is in the 
hands of the upper strata. So there is nothing for 
it but to let them carry on, even if, apart from the 
political cost, the social cost is enormous.
The income of  the labour force has to be 
squeezed not only to feed accumulation, but also 
so that the exorbitant State expenditure referred to 
can be covered, in so far as corrective measures are 
not viable, by non-inflationary means. Herein lies 
the aberration of the system.
It will not be superfluous to reiterate here what 
I have already emphasized in earlier articles. The 
system heads for a crisis when, under the impulse 
of  the democratization process, the power of  the 
labour force is strengthened, while at the same time 
the functions of  the State are expanded: in other 
words, when the twofold pressure for participation 
in the surplus becomes increasingly severe.
7. Economists in face of the outcome of the 
crisis of the system
There is something poignant about the situation of 
those economists with a sense of social justice who 
share the responsibility for a policy of this kind with 
the new political protagonists entering the scene 
in consequence of  the use of  force. They have to 
resign themselves to adopting the obsolete rules of 
monetary and fiscal orthodoxy, since they have no 
others within their reach.
I say economists with a social sense, for there are 
also some who in the full tide of neoclassical euphoria 
have become convinced of the need to sacrifice the 
labour force because it has not been capable of 
respecting market laws. The free play of these laws 
must be re-established by suppressing the power of the 
labour force outright; and this not without a certain 
satisfaction in wielding the rod! Only in addition the 
power of the upper strata to appropriate and increase 
the surplus is likewise re-established.
I should be sorry to make no mention here 
of yet other economists who hold prudently aloof 
from so disconcerting a scenario. Some cherish 
the hope that the institutional recovery which one 
day will come about may give them a chance to 
recommend redistributive measures consistent with 
their ideologies, or, perhaps, a monetary and fiscal 
policy free from the bonds of dogma; whereby they 
lay themselves open to the vicissitudes of  a new 
political cycle and to a new frustration.
Others, again, are awaiting their opportunity 
to transform the system. Only the transformation 
they advocate is not the one I am proposing to set 
forth here.
8. In default of a new option
The use of force supervenes because there appears 
to be only one alternative to the option advocated 
by the neoclassical economists, namely, that of 
transferring the ownership and management of the 
means of  production to the State: an alternative 
which is based, in the last analysis, on a political 
regime radically different from democratic liberalism. 
In both cases recourse is had to authoritarianism. In 
the one, to a conjunctural authoritarianism which 
sanctifies the social inequity of the system; and in 
the other, to a structural authoritarianism stemming 
from a concept of social equity.
There does not seem to be another option, 
combining this concept of social equity with vigorous 
development, popular participation and the advance 
and consolidation of the democratization process.
9. The neoclassical option
The use of force makes it possible to follow certain 
neoclassical principles, although suitably trimmed 
to accommodate dominant interests, and not always 
skilfully applied.
Moreover, under the aegis of  these principles 
measures are taken that differ widely according to 
the countries concerned and the aptitude of those 
who adopt them, whether they concern internal 
development or relations with the centres. The results 
also vary a great deal, with respect both to the rate 
of development and to relations with the centres. But 
over this diversity a common denominator prevails: 
the aggravation of social inequality.
Neoclassical reasoning, of course, is based on 
the regulatory action of personal interest under a 
system of free competition. It will be useful to recall 
the argument in question. Driven by the powerful 
motive of  personal interest, in their economic 
activity the owners of the means of production select 
the techniques and capital investments that offer the 
highest productivity and the biggest profits. But the 
interplay of competition reduces profits until they 
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are wiped out, and all that is left is the entrepreneurs’ 
remuneration for their work as such. The conclusion 
is patent. The whole community benefits if the forces 
of the system are granted free play.
In our preceding articles we have tried to show 
that this is not so; for, far from the system’s tending 
towards the elimination of  profits, they increase, 
and are perpetually retained by the owners of the 
means of production in the shape of a surplus, thus 
giving impetus to the privileged-consumer society. 
This structural phenomenon of the surplus has been 
overlooked by the neoclassical economists. And for 
this reason above all, their arguments are hopelessly 
divorced from the realities of the periphery.
Similarly, the facts uncompromisingly belie the 
notion of a spontaneous trend towards full and efficient 
utilization of productive resources. These economists 
fail to note the squandering of accumulation potential; 
nor do they observe the waste of manpower, especially 
in the lower strata of  the social structure. Faced 
with the immense harm done to the biosphere under 
the full operation of market laws, they impute it to 
exogenous factors which have no bearing whatever 
on the virtue of their principles.
Where is that ‘invisible hand’ which was to 
assign those productive resources wisely, and 
equitably disseminate the fruits of development?
10. Economic liberalism and political liberalism
Over and over again we have endeavoured to show 
that this is not how peripheral capitalism works. 
It promotes concentration of  economic power 
and distributional inequity. And the concentration 
of  economic power brings in its train that of  the 
political power of the advantaged strata.
It is true that in the course of the democratization 
process the sharing capacity that the labour force 
gradually acquires tends to counterpoise the power 
of the privileged strata, as well as that of the State. 
But the evolution of the crisis finally culminates in 
the use of force. Thus democratic liberalism breaks 
down, while the ideas of economic liberalism flourish 
–an adulterated liberalism which, far from bringing 
with it the dissemination of the fruits of development, 
flagrantly consolidates social inequity.
Obviously the Latin American region of  the 
periphery has not yet succeeded in establishing 
democratic liberalism on a firm footing; we are 
all too familiar with its vicissitudes, its promising 
forward strides and its painful setbacks. But the past 
cannot account for everything. New and complex 
elements make their appearance as changes take 
place in the social structure through the agency of 
technique. The use of force acquires a significance 
different from that attaching to it in other days: 
it involves the aforesaid absolute divorce between 
democratic liberalism and economic liberalism.
What is the essential concept of  democratic 
liberalism? To prevent the arbitrary concentration 
of  political power at the expense of  the liberties 
and rights of the individual and of his social and 
political participation. Economic liberalism, in its 
turn, means distributing the fruits of development 
to the whole community and thus disseminating 
economic power, in full consonance with the political 
objectives of  democratic liberalism. Both sprang 
from a common philosophical source; nevertheless, 
in peripheral capitalism they become mutually 
contradictory. The use of  force enables economic 
liberalism to be re-established –in accordance with 
the neoclassical option– at the cost of the relentless 
sacrifice of political liberalism. And both forms of 
liberalism come to grief  under that other option 
which consists in transferring the management of 
the economy to the State.
II
outlines of change
1. A synthesis of socialism and liberalism
In embarking upon this outline sketch, I must make my 
goal perfectly clear. I am seeking a synthesis between 
socialism and liberalism or, if preferred, a version of 
socialism based on the freedom of the individual and 
on new patterns of social coexistence.
Socialism, inasmuch as the State will have 
to shoulder one responsibility of  fundamental 
importance, among others: the responsibility of 
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democratically deciding how social use is to be made 
of  the surplus in order to accumulate the fruits 
of  technical progress much more intensively and 
distribute them equitably.
And liberalism, in so far as the discharge of this 
responsibility must be compatible with the exercise 
of  economic freedom, both because of  what it 
means in itself  and because it is essential to political 
freedom and to the human rights inherent therein.
This synthesis of  socialism and liberalism is 
the new option which I am proposing to explore 
in these pages.
In doing so I wish to state expressly that I am 
not drawing my inspiration from certain currents of 
European social democracy –especially important 
in the Federal Republic of  Germany– in which 
enlightened Latin Americans think a solution for 
our problem is to be found.
It is true that some European countries have 
attained the utopian ideal of widespread dissemination 
of the fruits of development. The problem is no longer 
that of accumulation –which, after a lengthy process, 
they have largely resolved– but one of continuing to 
forge ahead and progressively arrive at new patterns 
of management and social participation.
In the periphery we need to resolve the problems 
of  accumulation and distribution at one and the 
same time. And we cannot, like the countries referred 
to, invoke the so-called social market economy, 
because the social structure underlying the market 
in the Latin American region of  the periphery is 
fundamentally different from that of the countries 
which have attained a high degree of development.
At the other extreme of  European socialism 
lies Marxism-Leninism. In the Soviet Union an 
enormous and deliberate effort has been made in 
respect of accumulation and equitable distribution. 
The demands of  the doctrine in question, the 
historical conditions in which this great social 
experiment was launched, and the unfavourable 
constellation of international forces amid which it 
has had to pursue its course, have there combined 
with ideological considerations to build up a regime 
in which State ownership and management of the 
means of  production has consequences that are 
incompatible with the aspirations of  democratic 
liberalism and its inherent values. For me this 
is of  definitive significance. I am averse to this 
system –great as is my respect for what has been 
achieved– on political grounds as well as on others 
of an economic nature.
I shall dwell later on the weighty reasons I 
have for thinking on these lines. Here I must utter 
a value judgement which nothing could induce me 
to renounce. It is not enough for a system to permit 
of social equity and vigorous development; it must 
also be compatible with the prevalence of  certain 
principles which have gradually crystallized in the 
uneven course of  democratic liberalism. They are 
a legacy which we have inherited from Western 
civilization, whose full significance is never better 
felt and understood than when those principles are 
violated and eclipsed.
Let us therefore shake off  an intellectual 
dependence which clouds our view of  our own 
problems. This calls for explicit statement of  our 
objectives, and, above all, for clear-cut emphasis on 
the values by which they are inspired.
The social objective is obvious. The distributional 
disparities of  a structural character in peripheral 
capitalism are extremely serious, and must be 
corrected through the social use of  the surplus. 
This is the objective of equity, which could not be 
lastingly attained without a higher rate of  capital 
accumulation, in respect not only of physical goods 
but also of education of human beings.
This last is of  great importance, since apart 
from the structural inequalities there are others of a 
functional nature which derive from the differences in 
individual capacity to meet the increasingly complex 
requirements of technique. The acquisition of the 
necessary skills is strongly influenced by the social 
power inherent in the position of the individual in the 
structure of society. At the same time, the correction 
of structural disparities would be incomplete indeed 
unless, by virtue of an intensive educational effort, the 
great differences in social power were progressively 
smoothed away. On no other basis could functional 
inequalities be justified.
Income distribution must be dynamic if  it is 
to be lasting; accordingly, it necessitates vigorous 
development. Although in the centres it has become the 
fashion to consider the possibility of calling a halt to 
the dynamic impetus, in the periphery we are still a very 
long way from attaining such conditions as would make 
it possible to enter upon a phase of this kind. Decidedly, 
the growth rate of the product must be speeded up; 
its composition, however, must not be the same, but 
needs altering to meet the requirements of  social 
equity. And also the demands of the biosphere.
This endeavour to step up growth poses a 
dilemma whose vital significance cannot be bypassed. 
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We have referred to it in passing. Will it be necessary 
to transfer the ownership and management of the 
means of production to the State in order to secure 
the social use of the surplus? and can this be done 
without detriment to personal freedom?
An integral and inseparable part of  personal 
freedom is economic freedom. Here we come upon 
a value judgement whose scope must be defined. 
When in the exercise of this economic freedom the 
urge to consume acquires exaggerated proportions it 
must inevitably end by eroding other human values. 
Would this trend have to be repressed? Would that 
be the work of  the omnipotent and omniscient 
State? The solution must spring from those essential 
rights of the individual and from his membership 
of the social community. Persuasion, not coercion. 
But persuasion of a very different order from that 
exerted by the formidable interests which are the 
motive power behind the consumer society.
Persuasion and creative participation, from the 
classroom to the mass communication media.
Why not use those media to formulate and 
propagate human values which conspicuous 
consumption is smothering? Why should not new 
motivation emerge to stay economic interest from 
penetrating deeper than is essential for the economic 
efficiency of the system?
The human values in quest ion are of 
transcendent importance. It is not our province to 
enlarge upon them now. In the vastness of  Latin 
America there will be others better qualified to speak 
of them. But the transformation of the system will 
have to create the right conditions for these values 
to spring up and bear fruit. And also for the rescue 
of certain ethical principles which are foundering in 
the tides of market forces.
They are principles essential to social cohesion, 
without which the new system would run the risk of 
disintegrative instability. And those principles could 
not be imposed by State coercion.
2. Social use of the surplus
It has already been shown in the appropriate context 
that the private use of the surplus lacks collective 
rationality and is ultimately the source of major flaws 
in the system. Its rationality pertains essentially to the 
limited scenario of the privileged-consumer society.
Consequently, the State must determine how the 
surplus will have to be used in order to attain the 
economic and social objectives of change. To fulfil 
these objectives the rate of capital accumulation must 
be speeded up as intensively as possible in order that 
the increment in the labour force may be employed 
in conditions of  increasing productivity, together 
with the manpower in the lower layers of technology 
and that part of  the active population, mainly in 
the middle strata, which the system spuriously 
absorbs, largely because of  the insufficiency of 
capital accumulation.
The social use of  the surplus will make it 
possible to imbue the new system with a dynamic 
fundamentally different from that characterizing 
peripheral capitalism.
I shall now proceed to explain in what the 
social use of  the surplus consists, presenting my 
ideas somewhat schematically, since I shall confine 
myself to expounding them in broad outline in order 
to facilitate critical analysis. Consequently, I am not 
proposing to go into aspects which, albeit important, 
would distract attention from what I consider to be 
of paramount significance. In any event, I hope to 
have the opportunity of dealing with them in some 
other study.
The social use of the surplus is a way of meeting 
the need for the State to establish an impersonal and 
collective accumulation and distribution discipline, 
compatible with the exercise of economic freedom 
within the play of market forces.
Under this accumulation discipline, all 
enterprises would be expected to increase the 
amount of  the surplus devoted to accumulation, 
at the expense of consumption on the part of the 
owners of the means of production.
Furthermore, accumulation would also have to be 
increased at the expense of consumption by those who 
carry executive responsibilities and by personnel of 
enterprises who, thanks to their skills, spontaneously 
obtain a share of the surplus in the higher strata and 
the upper fringe of the middle strata.
While all enterprises would have to step up their 
capital accumulation, redistributive responsibilities 
would be incumbent only upon those in which most 
of the surplus derives from their concentration of 
a large proportion of  the means of  production. 
Medium-sized and small enterprises would therefore 
be responsible for accumulation alone.
Part of the surplus in the large enterprises would 
be distributed not only to their own labour force but 
also to the manpower working in all enterprises as 
a whole. Thus the distributional disparities of  a 
structural character would gradually be corrected. 
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And thus too the private and social consumption of 
the labour force could be increased, at the expense 
of the consumption of the privileged strata.
The distribution struggle which at present 
distorts the operation of the system would then have 
been replaced by a discipline based on consideration 
of  social equity that were compatible with the 
economic efficiency of the new system.
All that would remain would be functional pay 
differentials. As their capacity, experience and skills 
increased, individuals would climb above the rest to 
higher rungs on the ladder of  responsibilities and 
remunerations. This indispensable social mobility 
calls for appropriate training patterns so as gradually 
to do away with the differences in social power.
In addition to this method of  encouraging 
individual productivity, others are conceivable in 
relation to the entire personnel of  each enterprise 
and to the growth of its surplus.
3. ownership and accumulation of capital
The time has now come to speak of the ownership 
of  the capital which mounts up as the surplus 
accumulates. It should first be recalled that the major 
evils of  the system do not derive from ownership 
in itself, but from private appropriation of  the 
surplus and the concentration it brings in its train. 
There are three possible approaches susceptible of 
combination in different ways:
– distribution of  the new capital among the 
labour force;
– accumulation mainly in the hands of  those 
owning the means of production;
– accumulation by the State.
The first approach implies assigning the labour 
force an increasing share in the responsibility for 
accumulation. This growing capital accumulation on 
the part of the labour force would gradually pave 
the way for its management of the large enterprises, 
which would thus become self-managed enterprises 
if  and when it held a majority of the shares.
The second method, relating to compulsory 
accumulation by the present owners of the means 
of production themselves, would give them greater 
interest in the operation of  the enterprises than 
in the preceding case, but would also strengthen 
concentration of capital in the upper strata. With 
the disappearance of the owners, however, the capital 
accumulated could be partly redistributed to the 
labour force, and in this way the redistribution of 
successive surpluses would be initiated. These too 
would become self-managed enterprises, although 
the process would take longer than in the former 
instance. In all this pragmatic consideration are of 
great importance.
Let us now look at the third system of 
accumulation, whereby the mew capital would belong 
to the State. Not all enterprises would be socialized, 
but only the large ones. This would counteract the 
trend towards private concentration, and although the 
political power thus accruing to the men at the top 
would be considerable, it would not be unassailable, 
as in the case of total socialization. This is a point to 
which I shall revert in the appropriate context.
Moreover, this partial socialization, unlike 
general socialization, would be compatible with 
genuine political plurality. Party strife, however, 
might have very serious effects on the life of 
enterprises. There is no need to imagine these effects; 
suffice it to observe what is actually happening 
–with a few exceptions– in our countries. Directors 
of  State enterprises are not generally chosen on 
the basis of  efficiency criteria but in the light of 
political interests. And this fact, in addition to the 
spurious absorption of personnel, is prejudicial to 
the surplus, which sometimes may even be wiped 
out or converted into losses.
Obviously these adverse effects could be 
mitigated, if  mot warded off  altogether, were it to 
be decided that the personnel of  State enterprises 
should participate in their management. The regime 
would thus incorporate certain elements proper to 
the self-managed enterprise.
Attention must mow be turned to another 
important facet of capital accumulation when it is 
undertaken by the labour force. Whatever resources 
deriving from the surplus were devoted to this 
purpose would mostly be retained in the same 
enterprises from which they originated, in order 
to cover the expansion of  these or the formation 
of  new enterprises; with the remainder, the State 
would also promote the creation of new enterprises 
or would support the expansion or improvement of 
some already existing, especially those of small and 
medium size.
It should be reiterated that the distribution of 
capital to the labour force would mot be of effected 
enterprise by enterprise, in accordance with the 
accumulation corresponding to each one, but among 
all enterprises as a whole, and in conformity with 
impersonal norms.
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In addition to this participation in capital. 
a recommendable incentive to efficient operation 
would be to distribute to the personnel of  each 
enterprise a proportion of any surplus in excess of 
certain limits.
4. Distribution complications
The social use of the surplus is only the starting-point 
for thorny distribution problems. To understand the 
nature of these difficulties it is necessary to bear in 
mind the heterogeneous composition of the labour 
force and the power relations which it generates, in 
contradistinction to what is usually assumed in some 
limes of reasoning inspired by the mistaken notion 
of social duality.
For the purposes of our exposition a schematic 
distinction may usefully be drawn between the 
following structural groups, in accordance with the 
analysis presented in earlier articles.3
– the labour force which, largely thanks to its 
social power and also by virtue of its experience, 
possesses the more and more demanding skills 
called for by the penetration of  technique. It 
is found mainly in the upper strata and also 
at the higher levels of  the middle strata, and 
spontaneously obtains a share of the increase 
in the surplus without the necessity of trade-
union power, although it habitually resorts 
to certain combinations in order to boost its 
income, sometimes exceptionally fast;
– the wide range of economically active population 
in the middle strata which, despite the possession 
of skills –easily acquired, however, and inferior 
to those mentioned in the preceding sub-
paragraph– needs trade-union and political 
power in order to share in the surplus under 
the existing system.
This labour force from the middle strata is 
active both in the sphere of the market and in that 
of the State. And the interests of the two spheres are 
sometimes coincident and at others divergent, according 
to differences in trade-union and political power;
– the labour force in the lower strata, with little 
or no redistributive power; and
3 It is not my intention at the moment to offer a detailed analysis 
of the structure and the wide diversity of interests which come 
into play within it. I have confined myself  to mentioning the 
social groups which are of great importance in power relations 
and therefore in the distribution struggle.
– the increment in the labour force.
It is not superfluous to recall that an increase in 
the rate of capital accumulation is necessary above all 
in order to absorb at rising levels of productivity the 
manpower from the lower strata and the personnel, 
chiefly from the middle strata, spuriously absorbed 
in State employment, as well as the increment in the 
labour force. Upon this the social efficiency of the 
new system essentially depends.
This increased accumulation, however, poses 
very serious problems. We have already pointed out 
that the surplus must be redistributed to the labour 
force and that part of  it would take the form of 
new capital.
Obviously, there would be no reason to include 
in the redistribution process either the higher strata 
of the labour force or the upper middle strata which 
at present spontaneously obtain a share in the 
fruits of increasing productivity. What is more, the 
responsibility for accumulation, which is incumbent 
upon them too, should be borne at the expense of 
their own consumption.
In contrast, the accumulation effected by the 
rest of the middle strata, as they reaped the benefit 
of the distribution of the surplus, would be achieved 
without reducing their former level of consumption, 
which would be more likely to improve in a measure 
compatible with accumulation requirements.
These accumulation requirements should 
not be extended to the lower strata: among them 
considerations of  immediate consumption could 
be allowed to prevail over the need to accumulate 
capital. It is easy to understand how this can be 
justified. Dynamic income distribution is a process 
which takes a fairly long time, so that some response 
would have to be made to the immediate pressure 
of  the private and social consumption of  these 
lower strata.
Hence it is obvious that the transformation of 
the system might be largely frustrated if consumption 
pressures made it impossible to meet the demands of 
collective rationality, in relation both to the growth 
of capital and to its social composition.
. Incentives
Moreover, this frustration might go so far as 
seriously to jeopardize the dynamics of  the new 
system if  the pressure of consumption reached the 
point of impairing the system’s economic efficiency. 
Considerations of  social efficiency cannot be 
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overstressed to the detriment of economic efficiency. 
This brings us to the incentives already mentioned. 
The penetration of  technique demands of  the 
labour force an increasing range of skills, from the 
highest to the humblest. Incentives are needed –and 
opportunities too– to acquire such skills and make 
full use of them in economic activity.
With respect to incentives, an unfortunate 
confusion generally exists, which needs clearing 
up. An increase in productivity is the result of  a 
combination of two elements, namely: the technical 
innovations which take concrete shape in capital 
goods, so to speak; and the skills called for by 
technical progress. Participation in the fruits of this 
increasing productivity by the possessors of  such 
skills –including entrepreneurial qualifications– 
constitutes an incentive indispensable to the 
dynamics of  any system, although in peripheral 
capitalism it is usually carried to excess.
The surplus is a different matter: i.e., that part of 
the fruits of productivity which is not spontaneously 
transferred to the labour force because of  the 
heterogeneity of the social structure. Its appropriation 
by the owners of the means of production might be 
supposed to constitute an indispensable incentive to 
stepping up capital accumulation and thus obtaining 
new productivity increments.
If  the surplus were used essentially in this way, 
there might be a measure of pragmatic justification 
for its private appropriation. But that does not 
happen, owing to a countervailing incentive: the 
incentive to consumption in imitation of  the life 
styles of the centres.
Recourse must therefore be had to the social use 
of the surplus in order to resolve the accumulation 
problem. But how can that part of  the fruits of 
productivity which corresponds to the entrepreneurial 
activity of the owners of the means of production 
be distinguished from the part corresponding to the 
surplus proper?
The neoclassical economists had managed to 
clear up this question with great conceptual finesse: 
at the system’s point of equilibrium profits are wiped 
out, and all that remains is the remuneration of the 
entrepreneurs; so the surplus disappears.
But this is not the case, since profits, far from 
vanishing, go to form and swell the global surplus. 
Consequently, the problem has only an empirical 
solution. It is true that in enterprises there would 
appear to be a clear distinction between earnings 
and profits. But the earnings concerned, especially 
in the higher strata and the upper middle strata, 
are influenced by the surplus, and it would only be 
possible to separate these two elements empirically.
In brief, the dynamics of  the new system 
requires, on the one hand, incentives to productivity, 
and on the other, accumulation as an inescapable 
condition for redistribution of  the surplus to the 
labour force.
Nor must it be forgotten, from another point 
of  view, that in the skills made necessary by the 
penetration of  technique there is generally a 
substantial content of  social power. The solution 
does not lie in underrating (or politically attacking) 
their possessors, but in progressively eliminating 
that social power, by offering to all, and especially 
to those who are vegetating in the lower layers of 
productivity, adequate opportunities for training 
and social mobility.
It is worth while to lay yet further stress on 
so significant an aspect of  the question. Income 
redistribution will gradually smooth out social 
disparities of a structural character, but functional 
disparities will continue to make their appearance. 
The problem consists in getting rid of the residual 
element of privilege contained in these latter, rather 
than arbitrarily smothering incentives.
I hope all this is plain and simple. But in any 
event, it must be recognized that redistribution which 
is at once equitable and dynamic is a difficult matter, 
owing to the interplay of immediate interests. And 
I say immediate, because there is an unquestionable 
convergence of long-term interests. This convergence 
could be reached only after a more or less lengthy 
period of transition: but it is precisely this transition 
period which is of interest to study. We cannot fall 
back on the neoclassical –and also the Keynesian– 
economists’ hackneyed resource of  passing from 
one point of equilibrium of the system to another 
without noticing the changes which take place 
between the two positions.
6. The State and power relations
In discussing the operation of  the present system 
we remarked that its dynamic mechanism was in the 
hands of the upper strata, where most of the means 
of production are concentrated. Under a new system 
the control of this mechanism will be transferred to 
the State, by virtue of its fundamental responsibility 
for the social use of  the surplus. We likewise said 
that in order to discharge this responsibility the 
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State does not need to assume the ownership of 
the means of production, but is merely required to 
determine how the surplus is to be used in order to 
attain the objectives of change. But what State? How 
is the State to override the play of power relations 
if, apart from its own dynamics, it functions largely 
in consequence of those relations?
As long as power relations make it possible 
to maintain the dynamic potential of  the surplus 
–based on social inequity– it is almost inconceivable 
that those who primarily appropriate the surplus 
will be disposed to give it up on the basis of  a 
democratic consensus. But with the advent of  the 
crisis of  the system, its economic distortion and 
social disintegration, the democratic power of the 
middle and lower strata might be able to prevail over 
the power of the upper strata and transfer control of 
the dynamic mechanism of the system to the State. 
This is an option which might also offer itself  to 
those who use force to avert disruption: in that case 
it would be used to change the system rather than 
to maintain it. And if  things were otherwise, the 
option would still be open when circumstances made 
it possible to return to institutional normality. This 
normality, however, would be exposed to the risk of a 
new crisis unless it were based on the transformation 
of the system and of the State itself.
For the purposes of  this transformation, 
new rules of  the game are needed to guide the 
action of  those responsible for implementing 
democratic decisions on the social use of the surplus. 
They too are politicians, and motivated by their 
immediate political interests. Their power cannot be 
discretional: it must be exercised subject to rules of 
the game that are consistent with the economic and 
political objectives of change.4
4 Here the old rules of monetary operation are pertinent. They 
meant that considerable power was given to the monetary 
authority, but in line with norms institutionally established by 
the political organ of the system. And those who were invested 
with executive responsibility in the political organ also had to 
keep their influence over the monetary authority within bounds. 
This regulatory system generally worked efficiently as long as 
the power of  the upper strata made it possible to handle the 
dynamic mechanism of  the system without major upheavals. 
But this is no longer the case when the middle and lower strata 
acquire considerable power to share in the surplus. The rules 
of  the game then turn out to be inoperative or, worse still, 
counterproductive.
7. Planning the use of the surplus and 
institutional mechanisms
The new and complex functions thus assumed 
by the State will entail significant changes in its 
institutional mechanisms. Supreme intervention 
will be called for, aimed at achieving what cannot 
feasibly be brought about through the operation of 
the market, and differing widely from the countless 
ways in which the State at present intervenes, in 
many cases because it has not had at its disposal 
the institutional machinery to determine how the 
surplus should be used.
In order to meet the requirements of a collective 
rationality that the system lacks at present, the State 
will have to determine how the surplus is to be 
shared out among accumulation, consumption and 
State services. The incompatibility between these 
various purposes becomes increasingly marked, of 
course, in the more advanced phases of the system 
and leads to its crisis.
Accordingly, these different ends must be 
reconciled. But what are the criteria in the light of 
which the State will have to act? To what extent will 
it have to aim at raising the rate of accumulation?
I do not hesitate to assert that upon this last 
the success of the process of change mainly depends, 
since the rate of accumulation is an essential factor 
in dynamic income distribution. To that end, the 
absorption of the lower strata, of the labour force 
from the middle strata which has been spuriously 
integrated into the system, and of the population 
increment must be speeded up.
What are the dimensions of this task of labour 
absorption? How far will the rate of accumulation 
have to be raised in order to attain this objective by 
a given deadline?
These are questions that are very hard to 
answer, for the greater the effort made to increase 
the rate of accumulation the fewer the resources that 
can be earmarked for the early improvement of the 
private and social consumption of the disadvantaged 
labour force. The same problem arises –and looms 
very large– in connexion with the amount of  the 
surplus that the State will have to appropriate in 
order to expand its services.
The social use of the surplus entails constricting 
the consumption of the privileged strata to serve the 
above-mentioned ends; for this purpose a substantial 
part of the surplus and of the income of the strata 
in question would have to be tapped. A very tricky 
C E P A L  R E V I E W  9 6  •  D E C E M B E R  2 0 0 8 39
ToWARDS A ThEoRy of ChAnGE  •  RAúL PREBISCh
problem, this, since accumulation and distribution 
requirements must be weighed against the incentive 
needed by those at present carrying directorial 
and executive responsibilities in enterprises, and 
those who will have to take their place as progress 
is made towards the social enterprise. This relates 
particularly to the distinction between surplus and 
entrepreneurial remunerations, which, as we have 
already said, will have to be determined by pragmatic 
considerations in default of accurate criteria.
Lastly, once the new rate of accumulation has 
been fixed, how is responsibility to be shared out 
between the upper strata and the rest of the social 
structure as the surplus is redistributed?
The merest glance at the aspects of the question 
that have just been presented, not to mention others 
that for the sake of brevity have not been dealt with, 
suffices to take in the complex tasks which the State 
will be called upon to perform. These tasks will have 
to be carried out at two closely related levels: the 
technical level and the political level. At the technical 
level, the different aspects of the social use of the 
surplus will have to be analysed in quantitative 
terms, and various alternatives will have to be put 
forward as to ways of  using it so as to serve the 
objectives of change: a task whose results must be 
transmitted to the political level, where the pertinent 
decisions will have to be adopted.
I am stressing this last point, because, while 
the tasks to be undertaken at the technical level are 
of  great importance, we must not be seduced by 
the allurements of authoritarian technocracy. The 
fundamental decisions are political, not technical. 
In order to adopt them, however, it is impossible to 
dispense with the contribution of technical expertise; 
nor can those on whom political responsibilities 
are incumbent override the independence of those 
carrying technical responsibilities in so far as the 
preparation of their analyses and the presentation 
of their alternative proposals are concerned.
From the combination of tasks on the two levels 
should emerge the plan for the social use of  the 
surplus. Thus planning will acquire a meaning that 
at present it lacks, since the private appropriation of 
the surplus inexorably leads to disturbances which 
preclude the exertion of  deliberate and rational 
influence on the factors of development.
It is enough to propound this idea here without 
prematurely entering into details. All that need be 
added is that planning for the surplus will have 
to be extended over a number of  years in order 
to achieve a reasonable degree of  stability in the 
fulfilment of  its objectives. Stability, not rigidity, 
since, apart from any contingencies which may 
make it inevitable to modify the implementation 
of  the plan, it would not be possible to freeze the 
emergent power relations of  the different social 
groups, in which the changes that are taking place 
in the social structure find expression.
Nor will we go very deeply in this preliminary 
outline into discussion of  the institutional 
mechanisms to which the State will have to resort 
in order to discharge its responsibilities respecting 
the social use of the surplus. Suffice it to mention 
here the mechanisms relating to the above-mentioned 
planning tasks, to the participation of different social 
groups on a consultative basis, to the adoption of the 
pertinent political decisions, and to the supervision 
of plan implementation. It should also be recalled, 
in the light of cepal texts, that however great the 
extent to which the problem of accumulation and 
distribution may have been resolved, planning is 
necessary to enable the State to take farsighted 
determinations with respect to certain highly 
important changes in the structure of  production 
which elude the operation of market forces.
From another standpoint, the State will have 
to establish norms for the social use of the surplus, 
both as regards accumulation and with respect 
to the share in it obtained by the labour force as 
redistribution takes place. These norms must be 
linked to the tax regime and the changes which 
would have to be introduced into it in order to 
ensure the compatibility of different objectives.
As already pointed out, a substantial share of 
capital accumulation would correspond to the same 
enterprises in which it was generated, and a part of 
it to other enterprises or to new ones. Here the State 
will fulfil promotion functions of  great dynamic 
significance, for which it will need, of  course, a 
mechanism to channel financial and technical 
resources and encourage technological research.
Much could be said on these and other subjects, 
but to do so would mean overstepping the bounds 
of the preliminary outline of change to which this 
article must be confined. However, in recognition of 
the criticisms which have been expressed in connexion 
with the structure of production, there will be room in 
due course for discussion of indispensable measures 
to correct certain distortions in accumulation and 
consumption, whether by altering the price system 
or in other impersonal ways.
C E P A L  R E V I E W  9 6  •  D E C E M B E R  2 0 0 840
ToWARDS A ThEoRy of ChAnGE  •  RAúL PREBISCh
In addition, a wide field for discussion is opened 
up on which I must abstain from entering, both to 
avoid exceeding the scope of  my exposition, and 
because it concerns matters outside my province. I 
refer particularly to the constitutional regime for the 
surplus, that is, to the basic principles which should 
govern its social use and the necessary institutional 
mechanisms, the legal provisions relating to these 
latter, and the political handling of the plan and its 
possible modifications. It would also be necessary to 
establish the legal regime and the responsibility of 
the State respecting those enterprises in which part 
of the surplus would have to be accumulated.
These reflections on the State lead to a conclusion 
which needs emphasizing. Changes in power relations, 
in the structure of political power, are an indispensable 
but by no means a sufficient condition for the 
transformation of the system. It is necessary to know 
the object and the manner of that transformation; in 
short, a theory of change is required.
Nor, in turn, will it be enough to construct such 
a theory, if  no change takes place in the structure 
of political power.
The democratic option in question can be 
glimpsed, although it has not yet been formulated; we 
must zealously search for it. I hope it will be a synthesis 
of socialism and liberalism –a liberalism springing 
from its original philophical fountainhead.
8. Enterprises in the process of change
We shall not explore this issue either, but it does seem 
desirable to mention the changes that would have to 
take place in enterprises as a result of the social use 
of the surplus. In the light of what has already been 
said in the context of accumulation and of what we 
shall go on to say, the enterprises that would exist 
could be divided into the following categories:
– small enterprises in which accumulation and 
management would remain in the hand of their 
owners;
– medium-sized enterprises in which part of the 
accumulation would begin gradually to be 
effected for the benefit of the labour force as a 
whole, while their management would still be 
the responsibility of the owners;
– large enterprises, including any resulting from 
the growth of  those of  medium size. In this 
case progressive accumulation in the hands of 
the labour force would clear the way for self-
management;
– enterprises whose capital would belong to the 
State;
– foreign enterprises.
It is worth while to dwell briefly on the 
implications of this entrepreneurial plurality.
There is no reason for surprise at the special 
treatment of  small and medium-sized enterprises, 
in view of  what has been said of  the significance 
of  ownership of  the means of  production. What 
is of  fundamental importance is to prevent their 
concentration, since that gives rise to the concentration 
of  the surplus and, in turn, to a new process of 
concentration of capital. This objective will be attained 
through the social dissemination of capital throughout 
the labour force in all enterprises as a whole.
On the other hand, from the standpoint of the 
dynamics of the system and the incentives required 
to keep it going, the capital of  these small and 
medium-sized enterprises ought as far as possible 
to be accumulated in the hands of their owners. It 
must be recalled, however, that after a certain point 
the surplus in such enterprises would begin to be 
distributed to the labour force.
The importance of  accumulation on the part 
of  the personnel of  enterprises goes far beyond 
a redistributive operation. The dissemination of 
the new capital would gradually place a larger 
proportion of  the ownership of  the means of 
production in the hands of the personnel. A time 
would thus come when the latter would acquire a 
majority of shares that would allow it to assume the 
management of the enterprises, converting them into 
self-managed enterprises, independent both of those 
in whose hands capital used to be concentrated, and 
of the State.
This is a point of  vital importance. Self-
management is the concern of  large enterprises 
whose technical and economic complexity demands 
a strong sense of  responsibility in the choice of 
those who are to form their boards of  directors, 
which, in their turn, will have to appoint the holders 
of  executive posts. Different ways of  making the 
selection are conceivable. One of  them, perhaps 
the most advisable, would be to form three estates 
carrying equal weight: that of  the high-ranking 
personnel (directors and technical experts); that of 
middle-rank employees and skilled workers; and that 
of lower-rank employees and unskilled workers. The 
representatives of these three estates would form the 
board of directors of each self-managed enterprise, 
on which the State would also be represented when 
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it had contributed resources for the enterprise's 
expansion or rehabilitation.
These representatives, together with those of the 
present owners, would participate in proportion to 
their share in the capital, whose social composition 
would gradually change as described above.
The motives justifying State ownership of 
enterprises are common knowledge. They relate, 
above all, to those activities whose very nature 
precludes their competing in the market; to cases in 
which the dimensions and technical complexities of 
the activity make State promotion important; and 
to the purpose of counteracting the penetration of 
foreign enterprises in decisional fields which are the 
exclusive province of the country itself.
But we also know that the results achieved by 
public enterprises are not always positive. Hence the 
desirability of giving their personnel a share in their 
management, in combination with representatives 
of  the State. Moreover, there would be no reason 
to debar the labour force from acquiring shares in 
the capital of such enterprises.
Foreign enterprises pose a special problem with 
regard to accumulation. For, in contrast to what 
happens in the case of a country’s own enterprises, 
part of  the surplus is used outside the national 
jurisdiction. This fact and other considerations make 
it advisable to establish a special regime. Among 
such considerations it must be borne in mind that 
the changes in demand brought about by the social 
use of the surplus will enforce certain adjustments in 
the operation of these enterprises which will favour 
their transfer to national ownership.
In all this the State will have to act in the light 
of a strictly selective criterion, both as regards the 
establishment of new enterprises and with respect 
to the takeover of ownership by the country’s own 
nationals, once the technical and economic capacity 
for running the enterprises under a self-management 
system had been built up.
9. Distortions in the social use of the surplus
Whatever the extent to which the new system is 
based on a significant change in the structure of 
political power, it will not mean that the effects of 
the structural heterogeneity of the labour force will 
have been overcome. A long time will have to go by 
before relative social homogeneity is attained.
In the meantime, the new system will not be 
immune from dangerous pressures which could 
weaken the regime of social discipline in respect of 
accumulation and distribution, with very serious 
political consequences.
Under the new institutional regime, no social 
group would be able to improve its share in the 
surplus by its own decision alone. I am not of course 
referring to differences corresponding to individual 
contributions to the production process, that is, to 
differences of a functional nature, but to those whose 
origin is structural. The share in question could only 
be altered in accordance with the organic procedure 
established, subject of course to any modifications 
which it might become necessary to introduce. 
For an improvement in one social group’s relative 
participation in the surplus would be detrimental 
to that of the other groups, unless it were secured 
at the expense of accumulation; the same might be 
said of the share in the surplus directly or indirectly 
appropriated by the State.
Note the fundamental difference from the 
existing system, in which these various pressures 
are exerted without regard to their subsequent 
incidence and, if  they go beyond a certain point, 
their inflationary effects.
Such would be the rationality of  the new 
system and its elemental need for planning. But 
planning, despite its rationality, will not suffice in 
itself  to contain disruptive pressures. How can the 
various immediate interests be reconciled with one 
another and their compatibility with accumulation 
requirements likewise be ensured?
I am far from cherishing a mechanistic illusion. 
The wisest and most farseeing constitutional provisions 
are always exposed to risks of distortion and violation. 
But there are ways of re-establishing their regular 
operation, perhaps with certain reforms recommended 
by experience; and the same might be said of the 
institutional regime for the surplus. The power of 
certain social groups might overstep its bounds and 
secure political decisions which would have perturbing 
effects on the new system; or the system might suffer 
the consequences of populist irresponsibility. But in 
accordance with new rules of the game the exact social 
incidence of such aberrations would be ascertained, 
and there would also be known means of bringing the 
institutional regime for the surplus back into working 
order; another great difference from the present 
system, in which there are no rules of the game that 
can hold the inflationary spiral in check.
However, not very much imagination is needed 
to discern the consequences of persistent irregularities 
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in the course of  which the groups with most 
political power would end by undermining the 
very foundations of  the new system. Thus events 
might provoke the use of  force, either to impose 
the aforesaid rules of the game, or to bring about 
by authoritarian means a return to peripheral 
capitalism, or to enforce structural authoritarianism 
by establishing an omnipotent State through the 
transfer of the ownership and management of the 
means of production.
I say this in all frankness because I do not 
suppose myself  to have found an impregnable 
solution. I am very well aware of the great obstacles 
that will have to be surmounted. This is not a matter 
of formulas which, once adopted, will produce their 
beneficial effects by themselves. Strong conviction 
will be needed, both to arrive at a new system and to 
overcome the formidable obstacles which will present 
themselves in the course of its operation.
But is there any other way? A way which 
will enable vigorous development and equitable 
distribution to be combined with individual 
freedom? If  there were, if  this discussion pointed to 
it, I should not hesitate to follow it, retracing all the 
toilsome road I have travelled up to now.
10. The social use of the surplus and the degree 
of development
From all that I have said so far it might be thought 
that my arguments relate only to the countries at a 
more advanced stage of development, in which the 
democratization process is becoming incompatible 
with the system of accumulation and distribution.
But this is not so. In reality, I have placed 
the emphasis on such cases, not only because of 
the importance attaching to them, but in order to 
reveal the prospect that lies ahead of the other less 
developed countries, if  they do not profit in time by 
the experience of those that have advanced farther.
It is true that very marked differences exist. 
In countries where industrialization is incipient the 
proportion of the labour force working in agriculture 
and in other low-productivity activities is very high; 
so too, usually, is the rate of  population growth. 
Consequently, the problem of absorption presents itself  
on a relatively very large scale. How can it be faced if  
the surplus in the nascent industrial sector is tiny?
There is nothing for it but to resort to the real or 
potential surplus from agriculture and other sources 
of primary production. True, this is also necessary in 
countries with a higher degree of development; but 
there surpluses also exist in industry and in other 
technically advanced activities.
In the less developed countries in question, the 
two land tenure situations mentioned in chapter IV 
are to be found: estates that are technically well-run 
and others that are not. In the case of the former 
the surplus must be tapped with a view to its social 
use; whereas in that of the latter the surplus has first 
to be created, by enforcing in one way or another 
their more efficient exploitation. In both cases 
part of the surplus appropriated must be used not 
only in agriculture but also to give impetus to an 
indispensable industrialization process.
The same might be said of non-renewable natural 
resources, where usually a disproportionate amount 
of the surplus is transferred to the centres.
These are problems by no means easy to resolve, 
but a solution will have to be found if  a country is 
to develop vigorously on a basis of  distributional 
equity.
In any event, the experience of  the more 
developed countries shows that if  in such 
circumstances no attempt is made deliberately to 
influence accumulation and distribution, a course 
will have been followed that inevitably culminates in 
the exclusive and conflictive phenomena with which 
we are so deeply concerned.
Sooner or later the democratization process will 
begin to gain momentum, or to recover if  a collapse 
should have occurred. And whether the movement 
is spontaneous or violent, it is essential to beware in 
time of the risk that is run if  the process is primarily 
oriented towards immediate forms of  distribution 
and dynamic requirements of  decisive importance 
are disregarded.
And thus we come back to the same fundamental 
problem that is common to all, whatever the stage of 
development reached: the problem of accumulation, 
especially of reproductive capital, so that dynamic 
income distribution can be placed on a firm footing.
If  the movements inspired by concern for 
social equity do not face up to this problem, 
democratization is risking self-destruction.
Differences in degrees of development mainly 
affect those who will undertake accumulation and 
the aims they are to pursue. Of  course, where 
industrialization is incipient, accumulation will have 
to be effected in small and medium-sized enterprises 
in the hands of their owners. It is these enterprises 
that in the course of time will evolve in the direction 
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of  more advanced technical methods and larger 
scales of  production. Through the social use of 
the surplus it would be possible to give technical 
and financial support to the initiative shown by 
entrepreneurs; unquestionably a very important role 
for the promoter State.5
5 This is not the place to enter upon a discussion of the possible 
applications of the capital accumulated, but what it does seem 
worth while to stress is the potential significance of  State 
intervention in foreign trade. Here again the experience of the 
past can teach a useful lesson.
Not only import substitution is a necessity, but also the 
encouragement of exports. Asymmetry in industrialization will 
have to be avoided. It is true that this largely depends upon the 
attitude of the centres, which, as we are all well aware, have not 
been characterized by their openness, if  I may be allowed to 
reverse the usual application of the term. In view of this fact, it 
is all the more essential to press with renewed energy along the 
promising path of reciprocal trade.
III
The political art of change
1. Changes in the structure of political power
Obviously, the transformation of  the system 
–whether the point at issue is the socialization of 
the surplus or that of  the means of  production– 
cannot come about without fundamental changes 
in the composition of  political power. It is true 
that these changes occur as the social structure 
gradually alters. Political movements set afoot by 
the increasing power of  the middle strata, with 
the eventual addition of  that of  the lower strata, 
gradually strengthen the capacity of  these social 
groups to obtain a share of  the surplus. But they 
are essentially distributional movements, which 
never have and probably never could have got to 
the bottom of the problem. In reality, the belief  has 
prevailed that in this way the inequity of the system 
would gradually be corrected and the risk of radical 
solutions would thus be warded off.
It can now be seen more clearly that distributive 
democracy tends to bring destruction upon itself  by 
provoking the use of force.
To put it plainly, the option of socializing the 
means of production has been confronted with no 
other option capable of securing a majority consensus 
and thus averting the use of force. I do not count, 
of course, the neoclassical option, which is based on 
flagrant suppression of the democratic process.
The use of  force cannot be indefinitely kept 
up. As experience shows, force wears itself  out 
with the passage of  time, new leaders assume 
the responsibility of  exercising it and popular 
aspirations to political freedom and equitable 
distribution grow and multiply. And unless channels 
for the re-establishment of  institutionalism are 
opened up, the system is increasingly exposed to 
violent confrontations.
At all events, I cannot discuss political strategy 
without exceeding the aim pursued in these pages, 
and, perhaps, because it is not within my competence 
to do so. Furthermore, strategy must take into 
account the conditions really prevailing, in respect 
of  both internal development and relations with 
the centres. The difficult task I have set myself  is 
different: what is to be done when, whatever the 
strategy adopted, a composition of political power 
favourable to the transformation of the system has 
been achieved?
A change in the political structure is an 
essential but not a sufficient condition. And I have 
endeavoured to answer this question by exploring 
a new option which might combine, as I have said 
elsewhere, vigorous development, social equity, and 
participative democracy accompanied by respect for 
the essential rights inherent in it.
In the course of this exploration my particular 
intention has been to study the phenomena that 
occur at the more advanced stages of  peripheral 
development. I consider that sooner or later they 
are bound to appear in other countries, in view 
of  their special conditions. But in the meanwhile 
political crises in these less developed countries are 
of a different nature.
They are countries in which the way has not 
yet been cleared for democratization, either because 
of the opposition put up by the dominant power of 
the upper strata in whose hands a large proportion 
of the land and capital is concentrated, or because 
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the process is slowed down or halted by the 
various forms of co-option or manipulation which 
characterize a democracy in appearance, where 
external forms prevail over genuine substance.
Can the inhibition or adulteration of the process 
be indefinitely kept up? Can the system withstand 
increasing aspirations towards democracy and social 
equity? Supposing the reply were in the negative, 
and an important change in the power structure of 
the countries concerned were to supervene: What 
should be done? How could the illusions of a merely 
redistributive democracy be avoided, so as to prevent 
a repetition of  the same process as in the more 
developed countries? The answer cannot be the same 
as in their case, although neither is it fundamentally 
different, as will be seen in due course.
Let us now return to the countries where 
democratization has made some progress. 
Notwithstanding the ideological differences which 
characterize political pluralism under a democratic 
regime, there are generally areas of agreement as to 
forms of  direct and immediate redistribution and 
as to the expansion of State services, in which the 
paramount need for accumulation is disregarded. 
Nevertheless, accumulation, as we have repeatedly 
stressed, is the only way of securing dynamic income 
redistribution, and, therefore, a lasting improvement 
in the lot of the disadvantaged strata.
2. The political solution of the crisis
When the crisis of the system becomes acute, however, 
an irreconcilable rift is opened between those 
who still adhere firmly to a genuinely democratic 
ideology and those who profess other ideologies 
with a substantially different political significance. 
These discrepancies are too well known to justify 
a digression into hair-splitting discussion of  the 
use of  words, although they end by becoming an 
insurmountable obstacle to a political solution of 
the crisis backed by a majority consensus.
Important as this obstacle is, it is not the 
only one. Political movements that maintain the 
inescapable need for an omnipotent State, based on a 
single disciplined party, which can dissolve the power 
of the private owners of the means of production 
and take over the management of  these, have at 
their disposal a well-knit doctrine of change which 
they propose to put into practice; but the same is 
not true of those other movements of a democratic 
character. Among them there is frequent talk of a 
society which is neither capitalist nor socialist, and 
although these movements are inspired by the idea 
of distributional justice, they usually abstain from 
making a determined attack on the very source 
of  the major defects of  the system, i.e.; private 
appropriation of the surplus.
All this is profoundly serious and disconcerting. It 
is not surprising that in these circumstances an attempt 
is made to blame the politicians for not finding ways 
and means of resolving the crisis of the system. The 
responsibility, however, is one which those of us who 
hold forth about development must share, and in 
the highest degree, since we have been incapable of 
contributing to the search for a new option.
We have offered no such new option, either to 
democratic movements inspired by the ideal of social 
equity, or to those who resort to force in a not always 
successful endeavour to put the system back into 
regular working order. We can hardly be surprised 
when these latter, swept along by circumstances, 
and also by certain doctrinal preferences, succumb 
to the lure of simplicity as held out by the formulas 
of economic liberalism. And since the trade-union 
and political power of the labour force has violated 
market laws, with the ensuing disruption and social 
disintegration of the system, it must be suppressed 
in order to contain the inflation which is responsible 
for these evils!
Herein lies our fundamental problem. It is 
essential to offer a new option to democratic 
movements in order to forestall this grave eventuality 
in time: whether democratization is resolutely pushing 
ahead where it has been unable to develop, or whether 
it is being revived where it had been suppressed.
In such cases there would no longer be the option 
of an economic liberalism which can be maintained 
only by the use of force. And the lack of a new option 
could lead to serious capitulations on the part of 
those who, motivated by deep-rooted aspirations to 
social equity, might allow themselves to be seduced 
by the illusion that transfer of the ownership and 
management of the means of production to the State 
is the best way of fulfilling these aspirations without 
sacrificing democratic plurality.
Very striking, moreover, is the social ferment 
seething in the Church. And it is easy to understand 
the tribulations of  theologians and believers who, 
deeply distressed by the spectacle of  tremendous 
social inequality, seem to be prepared to compromise 
up to a point with ideologies of  change whose 
underlying philosophy would appear irreconcilable 
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with the spiritual power of  the Church. They do 
not need to do this. I hope they will consider the 
ideas which are set forth in the present article. While 
writing it, I have been profoundly impressed by this 
recent declaration on the part of John Paul II: All 
private property carries a social mortgage.6 Is this 
mortgage perhaps the social use of the surplus?
Furthermore, why should not this new prospect 
be put before the military authorities too? We 
have repeatedly referred to the use of force with a 
view to introducing economic liberalism without 
changing the bases of  the system. However far it 
may be true that those responsible are not necessarily 
concerned about the political cost, which some 
consider transient and inevitable, if  not acceptable, 
it is common knowledge that in the end many of 
them are disconcerted by the social consequences of 
an adulterated economic liberalism –consequences 
which are protracted if  not aggravated with the 
passage of time.
Is not surprising, therefore, that after a phase 
of  euphoria –fostered by some external evidence 
of  admiration– there should be growing dismay 
at the serious social implications of  this type of 
development, apart from its huge political cost.
Thus events act as a spur to increasing 
aspirations towards a return to normality, with certain 
institutional adjustments. But it is necessary to get 
to the bottom of the problem. Normality of course 
entails restoring the redistributive power of the labour 
force. How, then, is the development of a new political 
cycle to be avoided? How would it be possible to hold 
in check the conflictive tendencies deriving from a 
new inflationary spiral, or from the intensification 
of  one that had not been successfully extirpated? 
How can the exclusive tendencies of the system be 
counteracted, which, far from being attenuated, are 
usually aggravated under a regime of force?
Schooled by their frustrating experience, the 
armed forces might perhaps be interested in 
considering other options, such as that set forth here; 
with a view, however, not to imposing them, but to 
understanding the significance of  any democratic 
movements proposing to put them into effect.
In default of the other options referred to, no 
one can affirm that the course of  events may not 
incline the armed forces too to overcome certain 
doctrinal objections –hitherto apparently very 
powerful– to the option of  socializing the means 
of production.
3. Political significance of socialization
The new option described in the foregoing pages 
is based on the social use of  the surplus. The 
mere mention of this idea turns one’s thoughts in 
the direction of the socialization of the means of 
production, since it is from them that the surplus 
derives. This would seem to be a condition logically 
imposed by the transformation of the system.
But I think otherwise; and these are my reasons. 
The socialization of the means of production and 
their management by the State has very serious 
political consequences, quite as important, in my 
opinion, as its economic effects, or even more so. 
Socialization is indissolubly linked to a political 
regime which is substantially at variance with the 
values that have guided and continue to guide 
Latin America’s strivings after a representative and 
participative democracy in which basic human rights 
are fully respected.
I am conveniently placed to speak bluntly 
about the consequences to which I refer, inasmuch 
as I am very far from having defended peripheral 
capitalism in my earlier work. I have criticized it not 
only from the economic but also from the social and 
political standpoints. Accordingly, when I oppose 
the socialization of the means of production, I must 
not be taken to do so for the sake of exalting the 
virtues of that capitalism, much less to condone its 
social inequity.
Be this as it may, both the socialization of the 
means of  production and the process of  change 
that I am advocating impugn private appropriation 
of the surplus. The social use of the surplus is the 
starting-point common to both, but the roads to be 
followed subsequently are very different.
To place the management of  all the means 
of  production in the hands of  the State bestows 
6 See his opening address at the Latin American Episcopal 
Conference, 28 January 1979. The Pope also explicitly states 
the evangelical mission of the Church in face of social inequity 
in the following terms: it must preach, educate individuals 
and communities, form public opinion, guide those who are 
responsible for their peoples. It will thus be working for the benefit 
of society, in which this Christian and evangelical principle will 
ultimately bear fruit in the shape of a more just and equitable 
distribution of goods, not only within each nation, but also in the 
international world in general, preventing the stronger countries 
from using their power to the detriment of the weaker.
Those who shoulder the responsibility for public life in 
States and nations must understand that internal peace and 
international peace will only be ensured if  a social and economic 
system is in force that is based on justice.
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unassailable power on the men at the top, however 
they may have got there. That is where the lines 
of  command start. And the way of  life of  the 
labour force, or rather of  the whole population, 
their income, their promotion, the reward of merit, 
depend in the last analysis upon summit decisions. 
And in all this account is taken not only of personal 
capacity but also of militant loyalty to the system.
Ideological unity is an essential element in 
this loyalty and in the stability of the system. And 
the ideology in question is not one that is fed by 
the free and spontaneous expression of  thought, 
but one which emanates from those who carry the 
responsibility of power and feel the need to strengthen 
it by diverse means. Accordingly, there is no room 
for fundamental dissidence which may jeopardize 
ideological unity, party discipline and the cohesion 
of the system: a cohesion which might be impaired if  
the exercise of freedom of expression were to overstep 
certain bounds, or if artistic and literary creation and 
intellectual activity were to deviate from the channels 
mapped out from above. This is the cohesion inherent 
in and imposed by the system, which allows of no 
other manifestation of authority.
It is understandable, therefore, that the 
spiritual authority of the Church should be deemed 
incompatible with the omnipotence and omniscience 
of the State.
This requirement of cohesion in doctrine and 
praxis is binding even upon those at the summit. 
For if  any of them disagree over weighty questions, 
they incur the disapproval of  the rest, which is a 
very serious matter, for those who lose status in 
these internal disputes have not the alternative of 
expending their efforts in the sphere of  private 
activity, which simply does not exist. Thus the 
indefinite protraction of the leaders’ term of office, 
however long it may be, becomes an important 
factor of enforced unity. Stability of the system and 
gerontocracy!
In addition, the hierarchical links in the chain of 
decision and vigilance make it possible to nip in the 
bud the slightest sign of substantial nonconformity. 
The system has its own internal logic, and exceptional 
firmness of mind is needed to refuse to comply with 
its adamantine requirements.
4. The vitiation of the market
Furthermore, State ownership and management of 
the means of production is inseparable from a radical 
change in the nature of  the market, since what is 
to be produced and consumed depends ultimately 
upon a central authority. Thus the market loses its 
political significance, which transcends its economic 
importance. I am not going to idealize peripheral 
capitalism in this respect either; nevertheless, to 
whatever extent the course of  development may 
bring in its train an increasing concentration of 
economic power, the margin of individual freedom 
is still quite wide. Otherwise the trade-union and 
political power of the labour force could not have 
grown up with the advance of democratization. The 
only thing is that when that power interferes with 
the dynamics of the surplus, the use of force permits 
its suppression.
As I maintained in my earlier articles, the major 
defects of the system lie neither in the market itself  
nor in the economic freedom on which it is based. 
They arise out of the social structure and the power 
relations which pervert the social efficiency of the 
system through the arbitrariness of distribution and 
the insufficiency of capital accumulation.
It is true that under a strongly authoritarian 
system the concept of  the economic freedom of 
enterprises and individuals –an essential factor 
in economic efficiency– is not ruled out. But 
if  this freedom were to become genuine, the 
dominant nucleus would lose an element of cohesion 
indispensable to the stability of the system and to 
its own continuance in power.
What is more, if  economic liberty exists and 
entrepreneurs are free to use their own initiative, 
and if  these entrepreneurs emerge from within the 
enterprises themselves and not from among those 
in whose hands political power is concentrated, how 
could they be prevented from aspiring to freedom of 
expression and participation in political decisions? 
How far would it then be possible to separate 
political freedom from economic freedom? Would 
not the logic of  the system call for repression of 
the political liberty of those who, having acquired 
economic freedom, expressed discrepancies with that 
system or with the way in which it works? Could 
economic freedom be insulated from these effects?
. Political pluralism and socialization
Let us now pause a moment to interpolate a word 
on doctrine. In the scientific theory of Marx –which 
must be distinguished from militant Marxism– 
doctrine is an integral part of  the superstructure, 
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which is decisively conditioned by the basic structure 
of the system. Changes in the structure, as the forces 
of  production develop, promote changes likewise 
in the superstructure. There are no ideologies of 
permanent value.
I wonder, therefore, whether the changes that 
have been taking place in the structure have not 
something to do with the new currents of ideology 
which are springing up in other latitudes, and 
to which a circumstantial and temporary value 
is sometimes attributed, rather than a lasting 
significance. At all events they should be considered 
within a broader doctrinal context.
In these new currents political pluralism is 
explicitly accepted, in contradistinction to the 
hitherto dominant concept of the dictatorship of the 
proletariat, however it may be defined. Pluralism is 
a sine qua non of  democratic liberalism. And I do 
not understand how the latter can be reconciled with 
an omnipotent State which concentrates in its hands 
the ownership and management of all the means of 
production. If  democratic change is really the aim 
pursued, the new currents of thought must not shirk 
frank discussion of this problem.
6. Some initial political risks in the process of 
change
What I am undertaking in these pages is persuasive 
action. I want to bring it home to my readers that 
there is an option for change compatible with 
democracy and requiring thorough exploration. 
Should the findings of this exploration be positive, 
that would be only the first step towards inspiring 
and promoting broad political movements which 
could result in a majority consensus.
Subsequent events, however, might vitiate 
certain basic elements in the process of change to 
such a point as to jeopardize the existence of  the 
new system.
Among these elements I should like to mention 
the collaboration of  the present owners of  large 
enterprises who are efficiently performing the task of 
directing them. In our countries this entrepreneurial 
work on the part of the owners is still important. 
They must be given not only the opportunity to 
go on with it but also adequate incentives to do 
so, although it is true that they will no longer 
have the surplus at their disposal, since control of 
that dynamic mechanism of accumulation will be 
handed over to the State. But the owners would 
continue to earn interest on the capital accumulated 
in the same way as any part of  the labour force 
that accumulated new capital. They would also 
receive the remuneration due to them for their 
entrepreneurial activities, and other incentives linked 
to the global productivity of the enterprises.
If, in spite of this, stubborn opposition to the 
new order of  things was still put up, those who 
carried political responsibility in the new system 
might be induced to transfer all the means of 
production to the State. Thus, instead of a gradual 
change in the composition of  the capital of  large 
enterprises until their management passed into 
the hands of  the labour force, there would have 
been a sudden switch-over to State ownership and 
management.
It is readily understandable that serious 
distortions would be entailed by such a modification 
of some of the basic elements in the new system. 
It would not be only the large enterprises that 
were affected. We have already explained that 
medium-sized enterprises would increase their 
capital accumulation in the hands of their present 
owners. But as their dimensions approached those 
of  the large enterprises, they would run the risk 
that, precisely because they had accumulated more 
capital, they would be exposed to the transfer of 
their capital and management to the State. This 
would weaken the impulse to growth, of so much 
importance in the new system.
The effects of  this kind would be equally 
serious, or even more so, if  no attention were paid 
to the necessity of granting special incentives to the 
executives, technical staff and other members of the 
personnel of large enterprises. Their collaboration 
is of  the greatest importance in itself; and much 
more so in default of  that of  the owners. If  they 
were dispensed with out of excess of political zeal, it 
would take time to fill the gap. And then incentives 
would have to be offered similar to those which had 
previously been withheld.
Taking an unflinchingly realistic view, I must 
recognize that the great initial difficulties –not 
only internal, but also international– attendant 
upon the process of  change might lead those 
responsible for it to a measure of authoritarianism: 
a conjunctural authoritarianism, perhaps, but in 
any event profoundly regrettable. Strong conviction 
would be needed to prevent it from becoming 
structural authoritarianism. Undoubtedly, in the 
face of  obdurate opposition, the transfer of  the 
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ownership and management of  the means of 
production to the State would be a formidable 
instrument of  supreme authority of  a structural 
character. And the way would have been barred, 
perhaps for an unconscionable length of  time, to 
democratic progress.
IV
Technique, demand and structure of production
1. Consequences of unequal distribution
In my critical analysis of peripheral capitalism it was 
largely to the unequal distribution of the fruits of 
technical progress that I attributed the major flaws in 
the system. The aim of the social use of the surplus 
is to correct these flaws, as has been shown in the 
foregoing pages.
There are two main ways in which unequal 
distribution influences the structure of production. 
On the one hand, it casts demand into a mould 
which is wasteful of physical capital and labour; and, 
on the other hand, it promotes a certain selection 
of  techniques, and therefore certain patterns of 
accumulation, which also represent a waste of 
productive resources. To the best of my belief, the 
system of  accumulation and distribution that I 
am advocating will enable these deficiencies in the 
structure of production to be largely set right.
But that would not be enough, for the 
penetration of  the technique of  the centres into 
a peripheral social structure very different from 
theirs brings with it certain unfavourable effects 
on the efficient use of capital, which could not be 
counteracted under the aegis of the new regime, but 
would necessitate deliberate State intervention in the 
structure of production.
I have been rightly criticized for having shelved 
these adverse consequences, as well as others 
deriving from the erroneous choice of  techniques, 
in my anxiety to stress the paramount influence of 
the system of accumulation and distribution which 
characterizes peripheral capitalism.
In reality, I have had no difficulty in taking 
into account the phenomena to which these 
criticisms refer, since I have discussed them in 
former articles in this Review and in other earlier 
publications. Accordingly, in the present chapter 
I should like to present a succinct and coherent 
version of  those interpretations and to underline 
their significance.
I note that in all this there may be something 
more than a mere matter of  theoretical emphasis, 
since I should not be surprised if the influence of these 
phenomena affecting the structure of production were 
to encourage a certain trend in favour of the State’s 
taking it into its own hands, via the socialization 
of  the means of  production. In my view, from 
the standpoint of the social use of the surplus the 
socialization and management of these means by the 
State is not acceptable, for basically political reasons 
which I have already set forth in the appropriate 
context, apart from its economic consequences. For 
it would undoubtedly mean endowing the State with 
a power so considerable as to be incompatible with 
the conservation of essential freedoms.
If  this is so, it would hardly be possible to 
resort to socialization, not in this case to resolve 
the problem of  accumulation and distribution, 
but to remedy deficiencies that might persist in a 
new system, despite the social use of  the surplus. 
I maintain that the State has other means of 
correcting them at its disposal.
2. Reproductive and consumptive techniques
In order to understand the changes that take 
place in the structure of production in the course 
of  development the meaning of  the duality of 
technique must be recalled: on the one hand 
there are the techniques which aim at increasing 
productivity; and, on the other, those mainly geared 
to the diversification of goods and services.
I have applied the term `reproductive’ to the 
capital required for the first group of  techniques, 
inasmuch as the productivity increment obtained 
by their means enables capital accumulation to be 
increased, with further productivity increments as a 
result, and so on in succession, in a process which 
has multiplier effects on employment.
The diversification techniques also necessitate 
capital, not, however, to boost productivity but to 
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obtain more efficient goods and services, of better 
quality, or designed to satisfy aspirations after 
different life styles and conspicuous consumption, as 
well as social prestige and ostentation of wealth.
These diversification techniques cannot develop 
without the reproductive techniques. It is the 
productivity increment and the corresponding 
increase in income brought about by these latter that 
spur the progress of the diversification techniques, so 
that the growing demand generated by the income in 
question may be stimulated and tapped.
It would indeed be pointless to go on lavishly 
producing the same goods and services beyond certain 
limits, by virtue of the improvement in productivity. 
On the contrary, diversification allows the income 
increment to be expended on a ceaseless display of 
new and better goods in ever-increasing quantities.
Accordingly, the progress of  diversification 
techniques is the logical consequence of their close 
combination with reproductive techniques in one and 
the same production process. Thus the proportion 
of diversification techniques in the composition of 
capital tends to rise.
Because the fruits of  productivity are so 
unequally distributed, the use of  diversification 
techniques develops more intensively than it otherwise 
would. Thus the proportion of consumptive capital 
increases to an exaggerated extent, at the expense 
of reproductive capital. And this is of considerable 
importance in peripheral capitalism.
This social waste of capital is one of the major 
factors in the exclusive tendency of  peripheral 
capitalism. There are cases in which productivity has 
increased remarkably by virtue of the introduction 
of new layers of technology, but the fruits of this 
productivity increment, owing to their unequal 
distribution, are largely earmarked to satisfy the 
diversified consumption of the privileged strata, to the 
detriment of the social integration of the lower strata.
3. The consumer society and accumulation
One of  the criticisms that have been addressed 
to my account draws attention precisely to cases 
in which the privileged-consumer society has 
developed to a notable extent and nevertheless a 
high coefficient of  capital accumulation has been 
achieved. Accordingly, there is not an insufficiency 
of capital, we are told.
The insufficiency is to be seen, however, in 
reproductive capital. This state of affairs is aggravated 
when the suppression of the trade-union and political 
power of the labour force allows real wages to be 
squeezed for the benefit of  higher social strata. 
These strata can then still further increase their 
diversified consumption and their accumulation of 
consumptive capital.
Let us recall in passing what we have said 
in earlier articles. A considerable part of  this 
accumulation of  consumptive capital corresponds 
to conspicuous investments in costly housing on the 
part of the upper strata, as well as to certain State 
investments which are immune from considerations 
of economic viability.
It is not enough, therefore, to observe that the 
rate of accumulation has risen; it is also necessary 
to ascertain what is being accumulated.
Here I have another remark to make before 
leaving this aspect of the question. If  the object of 
development is not only economic efficiency but also 
social efficiency, consumptive accumulation should 
be kept in a proper relationship to reproductive 
accumulation. But unequal income distribution 
pushes demand in the direction of  diversified 
goods and services which necessitate increasing 
consumptive accumulation. This means using 
capital in short supply, notwithstanding the fact 
that there is capital accumulated and consequently 
capacity available for the production of  similar 
goods, although with less advanced techniques and 
a lower degree of diversification. This deviation of 
demand leads to waste of  the capital invested in 
these lower-quality goods, and to an increase in 
consumptive capital investment, while reproductive 
capital is socially insufficient.
Clearly, however, in the course of the development 
process these inferior techniques will ultimately pave 
the way for more advanced diversification techniques, 
as has generally happened in the case of capitalist 
development in the centres. But this process is 
prematurely anticipated in peripheral capitalism.
Some pertinent considerations still remain to 
be added with respect to demand and the structure 
of production.
It is an all-too-familiar fact that the mass 
communication media, so closely linked to the 
privileged-consumer society, resort to every available 
form of  collective suggestion in order to spread 
consumption of  diversified goods. And thus they 
persistently seek to penetrate downwards into the 
social structure, propagating at its lower levels the 
attractive image of certain goods which the upper 
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strata are dropping as they adopt the new patterns 
in which imitation of  the centres constantly finds 
expression. Needless to say, the abuse of  credit 
perpetrated in these collective suggestion campaigns 
generally plays a very active role.
The transnational corporations, of course, carry 
a great deal of  responsibility in the promotion of 
imitative consumption. But I incline to believe that even 
without them the privileged-consumer society would 
have developed, owing, above all, to distributional 
inequality, as we have seen so often. The vigour of our 
imitative genius must not be underrated!
Unquestionably, if  the privileged-consumer 
society lost importance, the mass communication 
media and the transnational corporations would 
witness a marked restriction of their field of action. 
But some exaggerated forms of  diversification 
might possibly survive which would adversely affect 
reproductive accumulation.
Accordingly, the State would have to intervene 
deliberately by resorting to taxation, that is, by 
raising the prices of the goods in which this tendency 
to certain consumer extravagancies chiefly makes 
itself  manifest.
But let there be no misunderstanding. It is 
true that I frankly encourage State intervention for 
accumulation purposes or in questions of  health 
and the necessary defence of  the biosphere. Just 
as taxes and subsidies are justifiable when they are 
used to influence the structure of  production in 
respect of foreign trade, that is, where the market 
is not efficacious.
Apart from this, however, I consider it essential 
to guarantee the freedom of the individual to pursue 
his own preferences as regards consumption, as 
likewise in the vast range of human activities, so long 
as he does not encroach upon the freedom of others. 
How, then, can one justify the State’s overruling such 
preferences and making the individual’s decisions 
for him? What reason would there be for it to take 
the structure of  production into its own hands in 
order to fulfil this authoritarian intention? Or for 
it to apply a wide range of taxes so as to invalidate 
those preferences?
4. Accumulation alternatives
Let us now look at another aspect of the penetration 
of  technique into the social structure. Income 
distribution also influences the choice of technical 
alternatives and, through that mechanism, the 
structure of production, favouring combinations of 
capital and labour which are at variance with the 
absorption of manpower.
It is a well-known fact that the techniques 
which have their origin in the centres signify a flat 
contradiction: they economize in labour which is 
plentiful and require intensive use of capital which 
is in short supply. Here in cepal, I believe, we were 
among the first to analyse this anomaly, as early as 
the beginning of the 1950s?7
This erroneous choice of techniques, with the 
corresponding waste of capital, is mainly attributable 
to a distortion of relative prices. I have maintained 
elsewhere that interest on capital and wage levels are 
not consistent with the assumptions of neoclassical 
theories and their conception of  equilibrium. At 
bottom, we are up against the phenomenon of the 
surplus which those theories overlook. Thanks to 
the surplus, enterprises have to resort to the market 
for only a part of their accumulation requirements, 
so that the rate of  interest is lower than it would 
be otherwise. Furthermore, wage levels are not 
what the market spontaneously determines, but are 
considerably influenced by the struggle of the labour 
force to obtain a share in the surplus, both through 
their political and through their trade-union power.
In reality, during the period of  almost thirty 
years that has elapsed since we drew attention to 
these phenomena, the technological alternatives in 
question would not seem to have been put forward, 
save in a very partial and limited fashion.
In the meantime, there has been a great deal 
of talk about how price levels can be reached that 
more satisfactorily reflect reality. Something has 
been said of taxes on capital goods or subsidies for 
the employment of  labour as a more appropriate 
response to the available supply of these factors of 
production. Ideas of this kind, and others, have not 
prospered, I suspect because insufficient progress has 
been made in respect of technological alternatives in 
which the centres have no immediate interest.
There is another form of waste of capital that 
is encouraged by the distortion of relative prices. In 
countries like ours, where capital is in short supply, it 
is a striking fact that factories generally work on the 
7 See Theoretical and practical problems of economic growth 
(E/CN.12/221), Santiago, Chile, mimeographed text, May 1951. 
(Published in Spanish in the series of texts commemorating the 
Twenty-fifth Anniversary of cepal, Santiago, Chile, 1973.)
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basis of a single shift, when they could arrange two or 
three. The blame must not be laid on price distortions 
alone, however, but also on other obstacles standing 
in the way of this more efficient use of capital. As in 
such cases it would be difficult, if  not impossible, to 
resort to support prices, various measures have been 
discussed by which the advantageous use of capital 
might be promoted.
Lastly, other criticisms urge that as new layers 
of  technology are introduced which are of  higher 
productivity than those that preceded them, the fall 
in prices leads to the liquidation of the enterprises 
affected, with the consequent loss of capital. This is an 
argument which is fairly often put forward. But how far 
is the phenomenon peculiar to peripheral capitalism?
I am inclined to think that the general problem 
is of another sort, since, as we have already shown, 
prices do not fall as productivity rises. I do not believe 
price competition is frequent in cases like these. In 
the dynamics of development new investments are 
directed towards taking advantage of the growth and 
diversification of demand, rather than towards forcing 
enterprises with higher costs out of the market. Thus 
the investors can reap the profits for themselves 
instead of scattering them through a fall in prices. 
The way to capture the market is not by this means, 
but by supplying new and better goods.
However, I leave open the possibility that 
evidence to the contrary may appear. In any event, 
I wonder whether in that case it would be necessary 
to resort to the price system or other appropriate 
modes of  intervention, or to fall back on State 
management of the means of production.
Even on this last assumption, however, it would 
be a moot question whether the intervention would 
have to be effected through instructions from the top 
or whether recourse would also be had to the price 
system and the play of  market forces, in order to 
moderate the increasing bureaucratization which is 
arousing so much concern everywhere, the socialist 
countries being no exception to the rule.
. The price system
I should now like to venture upon a brief digression. 
As soon as mention is made of  the possibility of 
using the price system for purposes such as those 
referred to above, the risk is incurred that this may 
be held to smack of neoclassicism. No such thing.
In reality, neoclassical theories have completely 
annexed the price system as if  it were the exclusive 
province of  their lucubrations. It certainly is the 
quintessence of their arguments as to the system’s 
tendency towards equilibrium, if  it is not upset by 
artificial interventions. But the price system existed 
throughout long centuries of precapitalism. There 
can be no other explanation either for the Emperor 
Diocletian’s famous edict, or for the admonitions of 
the Thomists in the Middle Ages. It happens, however, 
that the neo-classicists have dogmatically enthroned 
it as the supreme regulator of the economy.
In order that the price system may perform 
this regulatory role, the neo-classicists do of course 
accept certain interventions, with a view to correcting 
the so-called imperfections of the market. To this 
end they resort to taxes whereby those imperfections 
can be rectified, as in the case of those misguided 
selections of technique to which we referred in the 
appropriate context.
This path, however, could take one too far, as, 
for instance, when the price system is advocated 
as a means of  protecting the environment. Can 
it possibly be said that the serious deterioration 
which the environment has been suffering is due 
to market imperfections? Would it not be more 
accurate to speak of the harmful consequences of 
the unrestricted play of market laws?
There are also some neoclassical economists 
who recognize that market laws do not resolve 
the serious problems of income distribution in the 
centres. If  they were to take a more careful look 
at the periphery, they would see that here market 
laws do not resolve the vitally important problem 
of  capital accumulation either. If  this is the case, 
what becomes of the role of supreme regulator of 
the economy that is assigned to these laws?
Neoclassical theory disregards the social structure 
and its changes, as well as the power relations which 
accompany these, and their considerable significance 
in connexion with income distribution. How could 
it be expected, therefore, to impugn the privileged-
consumer society?
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1. Imitative capitalism
The question might now be asked, why a theory of 
change? Would it not be possible to reproduce in the 
periphery the capitalist development of the centres?
A few decades ago there may have been some 
justification for this persistent illusion. There is 
none now. It is fading –the illusion that we could 
develop in the image and likeness of those countries 
where welfare has spread to the masses (although 
not altogether) and democratization (although not 
without defects) has vigorously forged ahead.
What differentiates our imitative capitalism 
from the innovative capitalism of  the developed 
countries? We have tried to explain this in our 
articles. And now, before dealing with relations 
with the centres, it seems desirable to underscore 
the specific features of capitalism in our countries, 
which are really of fat importance.
It should be recalled that we have characterized 
peripheral development as a process of irradiation 
and propagation from the centres of  techniques, 
consumption patterns  and other  cul tural 
manifestations, ideas, ideologies, and institutions. 
All this in a fundamentally different social structure. 
Therein lie the contradictions from which the great 
internal defects of peripheral capitalism arise.
This imitative process is carried on under 
the time-honoured aegis of  the hegemony of  the 
great developed countries, principally the United 
States, and is set in motion by a capitalism whose 
centripetal character was and still is of outstanding 
significance, inasmuch as it is the origin of the marked 
contradictions which also manifest themselves in 
centre-periphery relations and which aggravate the 
major defects of peripheral development.
The next chapter will be devoted to this latter 
subject, while here we shall briefly review the specific 
features referred to above, recalling what has been 
said elsewhere.
The specificity that characterizes the peripheral 
social structure relates mainly to technique and 
consumption, the degree of  development and the 
democratization process, land tenure, the formation 
of the surplus, and population growth.
2. Technique and consumption
Owing to the great heterogeneity of  the social 
structure, the fruits of the penetration of technique 
are appropriated mainly by the privileged strata. I do 
not deny, of course, that the same thing happened 
during the historical evolution of capitalism in the 
centres. The difference lies in that, owing to this 
form of  distribution, consumption patterns are 
adopted in the periphery which developed gradually 
in the centres, as capital accumulation allowed 
technique to penetrate more and more deeply into 
the social structure. In the periphery, in contrast, 
we are imitating these consumption patterns when 
accumulation is not sufficient to fulfil its labour-
absorbing function; and this situation is aggravated 
inasmuch as the centres siphon off income by virtue 
of their technical and economic supremacy and the 
weight of their hegemony. This point must be clearly 
understood. The specificity lies not so much in the 
imitation of the consumption of the centres, which, 
strictly speaking, is a worldwide phenomenon, but in 
the dimensions which this phenomenon is acquiring 
in the periphery, thanks to the flagrant inequality of 
income distribution. To put it another way, the specific 
feature is the privileged character of the imitation.
This becomes more marked because the technical 
progress of the centres is not favourable to technical 
alternatives that are better suited to peripheral 
conditions, whence results one of the most serious 
contradictions of imitative development: a situation 
that makes it all the more necessary to exploit to 
the utmost the potential of the surplus.
3. Degree of development and democratization
Furthermore, the democratization process made 
its breakthrough in the centres when considerable 
capital accumulation had already been achieved. 
Whereas peripheral democratization is evolving 
before capital accumulation can meet the dynamic 
requirements of development; moreover, its bias is 
essentially distributional, and also conflictive.
It should be noted that I am not deploring a 
premature democratization process, but stressing 
V
The specificity of peripheral capitalism
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the serious consequences of  our having devoted 
attention to immediate questions of  distribution 
while bypassing the indispensable requisite of 
capital accumulation.
An additional factor is the tendency to 
disproportionate expansion of  State services, 
which is also largely due to the various forms of 
distributional pressure and spurious absorption 
of labour. But it must not be forgotten that this is 
generally combined with the heavy pressure exerted 
by military expenditure; it is not surprising; therefore, 
that State expenditure represents a proportion of the 
product that in the developed countries it took a 
long time to attain.
4. Land tenure
From another standpoint, it is beyond question that 
the prevailing system of land tenure has been and 
still is a stubborn obstacle to development, as cepal 
has so often pointed out. In the industrial centres 
this obstacle was removed at an early stage, with 
favourable social and technical consequences. But this 
is not the case in the periphery, where industrialization 
is superimposed on a land tenure regime which acts 
as a brake on the penetration of  technique and 
productivity, to the detriment of development. This 
is another specific feature of peripheral development 
which we will go on to examine.
In the context of the structure of production, 
reference was made to the diversification of demand. 
This relates above all to industrial goods and skilled 
services; but not to agriculture, where diversification 
is very limited. Demand, then, increasingly veers 
towards the aforesaid goods and services, prejudicially 
to agriculture. And employment tends to shift to the 
diversified activities. Thus the share of agriculture 
in the structure of production and in employment 
declines. This trend towards the displacement of 
labour sharpens as productivity rises.
But this is not all. Regressive income distribution 
and insufficient capital accumulation, by which the 
lower strata chiefly suffer, account for the fact that 
demand for food products is relatively weak, despite 
the manifest under consumption.
This often leads to frustration of the favourable 
effects that might attend increased productivity; 
there is not enough demand to absorb the larger 
volume of goods. And the consequent trend towards 
a deterioration in the internal terms of  trade 
discourages the expansion of production.
Here, then, one of the most flagrant contradictions 
of  the system is to be seen. Unequal distribution 
displaces the growth of demand towards increasingly 
diversified goods, at the expense of those that are 
less diversified or in which diversification is slight or 
non-existent, such as agricultural commodities.
If  the accumulation potential of  the surplus 
were thoroughly exploited, demand and the structure 
of production would assume a different guise, to the 
benefit of the less privileged social strata.
However, it is not all a question of demand. The 
land tenure system which characterizes the structure 
of  production, needless to say, is of  paramount 
importance where concentration prevails in the 
form of latifundia. As generally happens in Latin 
America, the inordinately large land rent ensured by 
the very extent of the property owned makes many 
landowners indifferent to the possibilities opened 
up by technical progress, especially in respect of 
yields. For the same reason they are more attracted 
by mechanization, since they do not need to devote 
as much time to the land as the application of 
biological techniques requires.
It is true that in recent decades the use of these 
techniques has been spreading, with noteworthy 
effects on productivity. But the large landowner who 
is reluctant to adopt them sees that nevertheless 
the value of his property is rising by virtue of its 
greater potential capacity. This is a very important 
feature which also characterizes urban land: the 
appreciation of  land value through the work of 
others, apart from population growth.
A moment’s thought should be given to the 
contrast with physical capital that this represents, 
in order to understand the position of agriculture 
more clearly. The owner of physical capital who fails 
to avail himself  of technical progress does not see 
the value of his possessions rise; quite the contrary, 
since in the end he is jostled out of the market by 
entrepreneurs who are more alert to the advances 
of technique.
It would seem, as has just been noted, that 
perceptible progress has been made in Latin America 
in respect of  agricultural productivity. But as one 
of  the major failings is progressively eliminated 
another comes to the fore. Undoubtedly, with the 
diffusion of  technical progress in agriculture the 
surplus is increasing; and this is a good thing. But 
unfortunately the excessive amount earmarked for the 
privileged-consumer society and for transfer abroad 
has negative effects on capital accumulation.
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Moreover, the agricultural surplus is crystallized 
–if  I may be permitted to use the term– in the value 
of the land. And this aggravates the concentration 
of wealth.
Thus agriculture displays very special 
characteristics. If technical progress is not introduced 
the surplus is less than might be obtained. And if  
it is introduced and the surplus increases and is 
used for the purposes of conspicuous consumption, 
accumulation potential is wasted. In both cases 
the effects on absorption of  labour and income 
distribution are frankly unfavourable.
These effects are more serious still when 
mechanization is introduced and the opportunities 
of accumulation represented by the resulting increase 
in the surplus are thrown away. Even though 
mechanization may meet strict criteria of economic 
efficiency, this neglect of accumulation possibilities 
precludes the employment of the displaced labour 
force and the contribution that might have been made 
to the absorption of labour whose productivity was 
low, by virtue of the multiplier power of reproductive 
capital. Consequently, to the waste of accumulation 
potential is added a waste of  human potential, 
whether it is left redundant in the rural areas, or goes 
to swell the ranks of the poor in the cities.
This remark is also of  concern to those who 
adduce the argument that mechanization cannot 
be introduced in small farms in support of  large 
estates. But where are the people thrown out of 
work to go? A blind eye is turned to the other 
side of economic efficiency. Moreover, it should be 
taken into account that in small and medium-sized 
farms yields per unit of  land are usually higher 
than in latifundia, especially if  the technical action 
of the State is effective. This is a socially efficient 
way of keeping labour in the rural areas until the 
acceleration of development –the transformation of 
the system– makes it possible to resolve this serious 
problem in depth.
. The euthanasia of the surplus
Let us now turn our attention once again to the 
surplus, upon which our theoretical explanations 
have pivoted. Its appropriation is certainly not 
a phenomenon peculiar to the periphery, but is 
common to all capitalism; here too, however, the 
specificity of the periphery is evidenced. It is worth 
while to pause for a moment at this point, since the 
matter is of considerable import.
We have basically accounted for the structural 
phenomenon in question by the regressive 
competition of  the labour force which remains in 
lower-productivity layers of technology, when newer 
and higher-productivity layers of  technology are 
superimposed upon these.
The consequences of  this phenomenon merit 
careful thought. Thanks to the capital accumulation 
which the surplus permits, in the centres technique 
has penetrated in depth, and by absorbing lower-
productivity labour from the lower strata, has 
spontaneously relieved the system of some of the 
regressive competition which prevents the labour 
force from improving its wages correlatively with 
the rise in productivity.
Thus the surplus would tend to diminish and 
finally disappear as the heterogeneity of technique 
gradually became less marked. In this way a degree 
of development is conceivable in which the whole 
of  the labour force would be employed in higher 
layers of  technology, using the most advanced 
techniques available at any given moment. By then 
the surplus would have been wiped out because the 
system would have been deprived of a major source 
of productivity increments, apart from the growing 
pressure exerted on it by the intensive expansion of 
State services.
Nevertheless, another important source would 
still remain: the successive innovations from which 
increases in productivity would derive.
As the system approached homogeneity, 
euthanasia of  the surplus would ensue, and the 
neoclassical economists would be able to rejoice in 
the illusion that the ideal phase had been attained 
in which competition between entrepreneurs would 
rapidly do away with the fruits of those successive 
productivity increments, through wage increases. 
Moreover, they would be able to point out what 
favourable effects had been produced by the 
unrestricted play of  market forces, with no need 
for trade-union and political power. But the illusion 
might be very fleeting, since the euthanasia of the 
surplus would pose a serious accumulation problem. 
There is indeed, nothing in the system which could 
spontaneously lead the labour force to compensate 
with its own capital accumulation for what could 
no longer be done by the upper strata.
This digression affords us a better understanding 
of the structural and essentially dynamic nature of 
the surplus. In short, it is a question of a historical 
category in the development of capitalism.
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The periphery, of  course, has a long way to 
go before it reaches this situation, owing both to 
its great structural heterogeneity and to the waste 
of  accumulation potential. This wastage makes it 
exceedingly difficult to absorb the lower strata and 
those middle strata of the labour force that find a 
niche in the system by spurious means. Here is yet 
another element in the specificity of the periphery.
And as we have explained elsewhere, in the 
periphery the twofold pressure on the surplus 
exerted by the State and the labour force tends to 
bring the system, much sooner than to a distant 
phenomenon of euthanasia, to a critical phase; for 
when this double pressure damages the dynamic 
mechanism of the system to the detriment of capital 
accumulation and the privileged consumption of the 
upper strata, the system reacts with a rise in prices, 
which inevitably leads to an inflationary spiral. And 
the spiral, of course, is not accompanied by a new 
regime of accumulation. I do not say that the centres 
are exempt from this trend, but there it generally 
occurs in different conditions.
6. Specificity of population growth
When the technical advances which protect and 
prolong human life bring down the rate of mortality 
in the centres, the changes in their social structure, 
and the psychosocial consequences which these 
changes bring in their train, are also favourable to a 
fall in the birth rate. Whereas the rapid penetration 
of the same techniques into the periphery takes place 
within a social structure where high birth rates tend 
to prevail. Hence the population explosion of the 
last four decades.
This is another specific feature of the periphery. 
It sometimes severely aggravates the problem of 
insufficient capital accumulation, as regards both the 
absorption of labour and the investment that needs 
to be made before the new labour force reaches the 
age of productive activity.
7. Poverty and the structure of production
What was said above of agriculture helps to explain the 
problem of poverty in a general context of development: 
another specifically peripheral characteristic. For poverty 
looms large, alike in rural areas and among the social 
groups that have shifted to the towns.
In face of this poverty problem, we are witnessing 
a certain amount of ferment in connexion with one 
of  those catchwords that are so seductive. It has 
been given currency, this time –perhaps mistakenly, 
in my view– not in the empty rhetoric to which we 
economists of  the underdeveloped world are of 
course prone, but by some of the northern countries. 
Thence we are now being exhorted with apostolic zeal 
to combat poverty and satisfy the `basic needs’ of the 
population. The poverty persisting in the developed 
world has been somewhat belatedly discovered, and 
we are being shown that this execrable social scourge 
exists in our countries too!
No heed is paid, of  course, to cepal, and I 
really do not know which is preferable: that it should 
go unheeded or that it should be credited with 
what it has never said or proposed, as is frequently 
done. Its studies are unknown in the centres, or are 
known at second or third hand, through spokesmen 
who are not always well-intentioned and are often 
contemptuous of our ways of thinking. cepal has 
long been drawing attention to the persistence of 
poverty and the inescapable need to raise the rate of 
capital accumulation in order to employ the lower 
strata at higher levels of productivity and income.8 
In other words, it has advocated dynamic income 
distribution, as we have explained elsewhere.
What happens, however, is that those who 
are proposing to eradicate poverty generally put 
forward their formula without explicitly stating 
how it is to be applied. Is there to be a simple and 
direct redistribution? Could the problem of social 
equity be resolved without affecting the system? It is 
understandable that this may be feasible in countries 
where over a long period of  time a great deal of 
capital has been accumulated, while poverty, in 
contrast, exists on a relatively small scale. But in the 
peripheral countries, where conditions in this respect 
are strikingly different, it is unwarrantable to shirk 
the necessity of raising the rate of accumulation as 
rapidly as possible. And we have already seen that 
beyond a certain limit this is not compatible with the 
dynamics of the privileged-consumer society.
If, on the contrary, the proposal is that 
distribution should be dynamic, if  the need for a 
transformation of the system is recognized, it will 
be necessary to say so and to say so outright. And 
this does not appear to be the case.
8 See Towards a dynamic development policy for Latin America 
(E/CN.12/680/Rev.1), United Nations publication, Sales No. 64.II.
G.4. (Published in Spanish in 1963.)
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Be this as it may, the ingenuity of the promoters 
of this formula is devoted mainly to discussing what 
needs must be met in order to eliminate poverty. 
And clearly their enthusiasm has already gone so 
far along this generous path as to compile a long 
list of basic needs of the human race, not only those 
inherent in poverty.
I recognize, however, that there are some 
who do get a little closer to the tangible facts and 
acknowledge the need for changes in the structure of 
production. But beyond this they do not go, perhaps 
imagining that these changes will come about in one 
way or another, especially if  responsibility for the 
structure of production is assumed by the State.
I apologize, however, for not presenting here an 
eloquent chapter on basic needs. Presumably I too 
could bring some ingenuity to the task; but I prefer 
to expend mine, perhaps because I cannot afford to 
waste it, on criticizing the system and suggesting 
how it might be changed.
Moreover, I maintain that individual needs 
should not be regimented, because regimentation 
inevitably means authoritarian enforcement. I have 
voiced elsewhere my concern in this connexion. 
And now, more than ever, my overmastering 
preoccupation is with the essential concept of the 
freedom of the individual, bounded only by the rule 
of not encroaching on the freedom of others; but 
in the context of a new system.
I sometimes think –if  I may be excused a touch 
of  misgiving– that some of  those who offer such 
formulas to the periphery from the centres do so in 
order to evade the problems of the new international 
economic order. Why listen to all this disturbing 
rhetoric, instead of  mounting a direct attack on 
poverty? Would it not be easier to hand over a few 
funds for the purpose?
It would be unfair, however, to maintain that 
everyone thinks on these lines. There are some who 
sincerely believe in this solution for the problem of 
poverty; while others, without harbouring illusions, 
consider that only by this means, using the image of 
the under-nutrition, disease and ignorance that are 
rife in the periphery, will it be possible to awaken the 
slumbering ethical conscience of the centres.
Let it be assumed for a moment that by virtue 
of  some such benevolent magic poverty could be 
eradicated without the need to accumulate more 
capital in order to absorb the lower strata at 
rising levels of  productivity. At best, the exclusive 
tendencies of the system would have been precariously 
corrected, but not its conflictive tendencies. Rather 
might these latter be aggravated.
True, there are fortunate countries which have 
another kind of  magic in their hands: abundant 
financial resources deriving from their non-renewable 
natural wealth. If  instead of  being squandered in 
the privileged-consumer society these resources were 
devoted as far as possible to capital accumulation, the 
problem of poverty could be effectively combated. 
And a higher proportion of  the surplus might 
be earmarked for the satisfaction of  immediate 
consumer pressures. But experience attests that 
opulence, as well as shortage of  resources, is 
perturbing to the rationality of development.
The distinction –of such importance– between 
the exclusive and conflictive tendencies of  the 
system should always be borne in mind. For the 
crisis of  the system is generated not so much by 
the pressure of  the lower strata with little or no 
redistributive power, but by the middle strata that 
have progressively increased their capacity to obtain 
a share in the surplus. Clearly, if  the lower strata too 
acquire redistributive power, the inflationary spiral 
is intensified, with all the ensuing effects.
Accordingly, there are two evils to be attacked: 
two evils that are closely interlinked and cannot be 
arbitrarily separated. Yet some devote their entire 
attention to poverty and others to the inflationary 
spiral; it all depends upon the prism through which 
they look. And all alike refrain in general from 
penetrating to the deep-lying roots of  the evils in 
question. I suspect that if  they did so, they could 
not escape the incontrovertible conclusion that the 
system must be changed.
8. Specificity and the process of change
In the light of what we have just briefly set forth, 
pursuing the lines followed in our earlier studies, 
there is every justification for this anxiety to explore 
new paths in peripheral development.
We have made a decided break with neoclassical 
teachings; nor do we find the key to our process 
of  change in Marxist theory. For the former, the 
problem of accumulation resolves itself  of its own 
accord through the unrestricted play of market forces. 
And for Marx, accumulation was a spontaneous and 
systematic result of  capitalist development. The 
periphery had no place on his intellectual horizon.
Deliberate accumulation on the part of  the 
State was, however, a dominant concern in the praxis 
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of  the socialism of  Lenin and Mao: a socialism 
essentially based on the socialization and State 
management of  the means of  production. In this 
there was a measure of authenticity, correspondent 
with the intention of arriving at a socialism adapted 
to the objective conditions of a reality different from 
that postulated by the Marxist critique of capitalism; 
but on political bases very unlike any we should wish 
to accept in this part of the world.
There is also an inescapable need for authenticity 
in the periphery’s process of change; that is precisely 
why we have stressed the specificity of the existing 
form of capitalism.
At all events, we must once again be wary of 
another imitative illusion. There is much to be learnt 
from the experience of others, of which advantage can 
be taken to reach a synthesis between socialism and 
liberalism. Such a synthesis would be the periphery’s 




in the process of change
Significance of the present chapter
The dream of developing in the image and likeness 
of the centres that beguiled the imitative capitalism 
of  the periphery has never come true; this has 
already been shown in our preceding articles. Neither 
have the great social disparities been gradually 
smoothed out –on the contrary, they have become 
more profound– nor has democratization made any 
progress: yet another hope frustrated.
What is more, the capitalism which it was sought 
to imitate is passing through a serious crisis which, 
because of  its structural character, is much more 
complex and harder to cure than the great depression 
of  the 1930s. Its repercussions on the periphery 
have already begun to make themselves felt. In our 
relations with the centres there has been a resurgence 
of pertinacious problems to which cepal has given 
priority from the time of its earliest writings.
These problems seemed to have vanished into 
thin air during the long-drawn-out boom years 
which preceded the present crisis in the centres. 
They were years of exceptional development in the 
centres themselves and also in the periphery, where, 
as we have so often pointed out, the prosperity of 
the privileged-consumer society was impressive.
The centres, and in particular the chief dynamic 
centre of capitalism, associated themselves more and 
more closely with this type of development based 
on flagrant social inequity. They resolutely played 
their cards in its favour. But as often happens in 
boom periods, attention was diverted from the basic 
problems, namely, the great contradictions in centre-
periphery relations.
This situation can no longer subsist in face 
of  the crisis in the centres. It is clearly out of  our 
power to shed much light on the nature of this crisis, 
but we should like to point out certain factors that 
play a part in it so that its repercussions on the 
periphery may be better understood. First, however, 
the basic problems in relations with the centres will 
be briefly reviewed.
Capitalism in the developed world has been 
and still is centripetal. The concept of  its power 
of  expansion throughout the world scenario is 
a myth. However great the initiative and drive 
of  its entrepreneurs may have been, it did not 
spontaneously carry industrial development to the 
periphery in the days of outward-directed growth. 
Industrialization was started deliberately by the 
periphery itself; it was a necessary result of the crisis 
in the centres. And this inescapable requisite of the 
periphery’s development is being met with a time-
lag so great as to give rise to a number of problems 
deriving from the disparity between the structure of 
production of the periphery and that of the centres. 
These problems primarily concern:
– the innate tendency towards external disequilib-
rium which acts as brake on the development of 
the periphery;
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– the economic fragmentation of the periphery; 
and
– the considerable differences in economic and 
technological power which characterize the 
phenomena of  peripheral dependence under 
the time-honoured hegemony of the centres.
The crisis in the centres is also the crisis of a 
development ideology which, from the chief dynamic 
centre of capitalism, has spread to the periphery, and 
in particular to Latin America. This chapter would 
be quite incomplete if  we did not end it with a few 
remarks which, besides being relevant, are timely in 
face of regrettable deviations and backward steps in 
development policy and relations with the centres.
The centripetal character of capitalism
1. Deliberate industrialization and cepal’s ideas
My assertion as to the centripetal character of 
advanced capitalism will not fail to cause surprise, 
since this, like other development phenomena, 
eludes the grasp of  conventional theories. It is 
fundamentally imputable to the centres’ retention of 
the fruits of their technical progress. These fruits, as 
well we know, do not spread to the rest of the world 
through a fall in prices as productivity improves. For 
better or for worse, capitalist development would 
have been entirely different if  this retention had 
not taken place.
Whatever  may have been the internal 
distribution of the fruits of technical progress, the 
demand generated by the growth of income in the 
dynamics of  development operates in the centres 
themselves, except for that fraction which is diverted 
to the purchase of primary commodities from the 
periphery. Moreover, the periphery’s corresponding 
export earnings are also converted into demand for 
industrial goods from the centres.
These industrial goods are being constantly 
diversified by virtue of technical progress and the 
investment connected with it. There is no incentive to 
place this investment in the periphery rather than in the 
centres themselves, where the process of diversification 
is stimulated by the expansion of demand.
Thus, the longer the time that goes by, the 
greater become the differences between the structures 
of production in the centres and in the periphery, 
with important effects on development.
We were saying earlier that peripheral 
industrialization was not the spontaneous result 
of capitalist expansion in the centres: initially, the 
periphery was compelled to resort to industrialization 
in order to produce technically simple goods which 
could not be imported owing to the crises by which 
the centres were affected (two world wars and the 
Great Depression between them).
Until then, in reality, it did not suit the 
immediate interest either of  the centres or of  the 
dominant groups in the periphery for the latter to 
embark on domestic production of  goods that it 
imported at prices lower than would have been the 
cost of producing them at home.
In those times of crisis which imposed import 
substitution it was impossible to think seriously of 
exporting manufactures; but as the industrialization 
process gradually gained momentum, the need for 
doing so became clearly apparent. Perhaps we in 
cepal were the first to stress this necessity.9
2. The centres’ reluctance to accept exports 
from the periphery
cepal has more than once recognized the periphery’s 
responsibility for having concentrated all its effort 
9 Thus, in a study published in 1961, attention was drawn to the 
“excessive channelling of industry towards the domestic market”, 
as a result of  the “development policy pursued in the Latin 
American countries and of the lack of international incentives 
to exports of industrial goods from the region”.
“Development policies have been discriminatory as regards 
exports. Assistance has been given –through tariffs or other 
restrictions– to industrial production for internal consumption 
but not to industrial production for export. The production 
of  many industrial goods has thus been developed at a cost 
far above the international level, when they could have been 
obtained with a much smaller cost differential in exchange for 
exports of  other industrial products which might have been 
produced more profitably. The same could be said of new lines 
of  primary commodities for export and even of  traditional 
export commodities within certain relatively narrow limits.” 
See cepal, Economic development planning and international 
co-operation (E/CN.12/582/Rev.1), United Nations publication, 
Sales No. 61.II.G.6, pp. 14 et. seq. (Published in Spanish in the 
series commemorating the Twenty-fifth Anniversary of cepal, 
Santiago, Chile, 1973.)
In another study it is added that “protection has, of course, 
been essential in the Latin American countries. But it has not been 
applied with moderation, nor has there generally been a policy laid 
down rationally and with the foresight which is essential for the 
alleviation, if  not the prevention, of balance-of-payments crises”. 
And it is subsequently remarked that “the closed industrialization 
fostered by excessive protectionism, as well as the unduly high 
customs tariffs applied to some staple agricultural commodities, 
have created a cost structure which makes it extremely difficult 
for Latin America to export manufactured goods to the rest of 
the world”. See Towards a dynamic development policy for Latin 
America, op. cit., pp. 71 and 72.
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on import substitution, without paying sufficient 
attention to exports of  manufactures. But at the 
same time stress was laid on the responsibility of 
the centres, and it was asserted that to have placed 
production for export on an equal footing with 
import-substituting production for the home market 
would have not been enough. In the large centres, 
measures would have had to be adopted to facilitate 
imports of  certain industrial goods from the 
developing countries, thereby giving these countries 
a greater capacity to import precisely those products 
for which cost differentials are bigger. In this way, an 
appropriate division of labour would have developed 
in the industrial field, widely different from the 
traditional pattern of trading primary commodities 
against manufactured goods.
Yet neither did the centres encourage exports 
of  manufactures from the periphery, nor did the 
periphery itself determine to launch a policy definitely 
favourable to such exports until the exceptional rate 
of development attained by the centres, in the course 
of the 1960s, showed the possibility of doing so.
The advanced countries’ prosperity had 
repercussions not only on the periphery’s external 
sales of primary commodities, but also, and above 
all, on its exports of manufactures. In some cases, 
the latter developed at high speed and import 
substitution policy was not merely weakened, but 
actually repudiated.
During those years the centripetal tendency 
of capitalism was in some degree obscured, but it 
did not disappear. The periphery’s strenuous export 
effort has not reached the centres to the extent 
called for by increasing import requirements and 
debt servicing.
The periphery has had barely a marginal share 
in the centres’ voluminous and growing flow of 
industrial trade, which a clear-cut liberalization 
policy encouraged. Its new industrial exports to 
the centres, largely handled by the transnational 
corporations, either involve mainly goods in which 
innovations are no longer such, having been left 
behind by technical progress, or else are confined 
to parts of  up-to-date goods in whose case the 
transnationals take advantage of the prevailing low 
wages, with no intention, however, of  introducing 
advanced forms of integrated industrialization.
It is understandable that the transnational 
corporations, spontaneously incited by their own 
interests, as has been remarked elsewhere, should 
prefer to invest in the centres themselves, where 
the aforesaid ceaseless innovations have their 
origin, and where increasingly diversified demand 
is concentrated.
But the periphery could send to the centres 
technically less advanced goods in respect of which 
it is acquiring competitive capacity and has shown 
its ability to export them through the endeavours of 
its own enterprises. But liberalization policy has not 
been extended to these goods; quite the contrary.
All this bears on the present stage of peripheral 
development. But it by no means signifies that given 
a new industrialization policy the periphery could 
not tackle production and export of  goods of 
increasing technical complexity. Such is the dynamics 
of development.10
Hence there is a blatant paradox in centre-
periphery relations. In the Kennedy Round, as in 
the Tokyo Round, decisions have been adopted 
to liberalize trade in those products in which the 
periphery lacks comparative advantages for the time 
being owing to the technical and economic superiority 
of the centres, which is manifested chiefly through 
the transnational corporations. And the goods that 
escape liberalization –defended by various forms of 
protectionism– are the manufactures (and primary 
commodities too) in respect of which the periphery 
does enjoy comparative advantages, or easily could 
do so through its own enterprises’ efforts.11 And 
new manifestations of inveterate protectionism are 
emerging in the industrial centres.
Nothing of  any importance has been done in 
the centres, then, during their spells of  prosperity, 
10 This is the thesis that Hector Sosa develops in a study in course 
of preparation for the cepal Review.
11 A recent appraisal of the Tokyo Round ends with the assertion 
that the results of the tariff  reductions have been very meagre, 
whether they are measured by the fall in customs revenue that 
these reductions would bring about or by the increase that they 
would have caused in the developed countries’ imports from 
Latin America if  they had been in force since 1976. Similarly, 
the centres still maintain a tariff  scaling which lays a heavier 
burden on final goods than on raw materials –particularly ores, 
hides and skins and textile fibres– as well as a vast and tangled 
network of  non-tariff  barriers. Lastly, while the six Codes 
of  Conduct and the reform of  the General Agreement itself  
clarify the rules of international trade, at bottom all they do is 
to confer institutional sanction on the practices already applied 
by the developed countries. See Pedro Mendive, “Evaluación 
de los resultados alcanzados en las negociaciones comerciales 
multilaterales (Ronda Tokio) hasta el 30 de octubre de 1979”, 
cepal, mimeographed text, January 1980; and, by the same 
author “Protectionism and development: New Obstacles of the 
centres to international trade”, in cepal Review, N.° 6, Santiago, 
Chile, second half  of 1978.
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to encourage imports from the periphery. It is 
common knowledge that the system of preferences 
established after long years of  negotiation has 
proved of  little significance because of  the serious 
limitations it involves.
To all this must be added the adverse effects of 
the crisis through which the centres are now passing. 
The growth rate of  peripheral exports has fallen, 
and although their volume is still relatively large, it 
is far from enough to allow the rate of development 
to rise again, if  we are to avoid an exacerbation 
of  the exclusive and conflictive tendencies of  the 
system, which would have very serious social and 
political consequences. These are knotty problems 
to resolve, in view, moreover, of the need to boost 
exports still further in order to cover the higher 
cost of  petroleum without indefinite recourse to 
borrowing from abroad.
3. The disparity in structures of production
To obtain a complete grasp of the nature of these 
problems it is worth while to examine them from the 
standpoint of the structure of production.
It has been explained elsewhere that development 
brings with it changes in the composition of demand, 
thanks to the increase in productivity and per capita 
income; to meet these changes, the structure of 
production also has to be modified. And here two 
vitally important options present themselves: to 
develop the structure of production in such a way as 
to satisfy part of the expansion of demand through 
trading exports against imports, or to gear it to 
producing at home instead of importing.
Clearly, the choice of the option that is more 
expedient from the economic viewpoint depends 
above all upon the attitude of the centres, apart from 
the periphery’s own trade policy decisions.
The attitude of  the centres was of  course 
negative in the times of  crisis that fostered the 
industrialization of  the periphery. It has already 
been shown, and can bear repeating, that the 
periphery was inevitably obliged to resort to import-
substituting domestic production. And it is a fact 
fully attested in the cepal studies that as a result 
the Latin American countries were able to keep up a 
rate of development which exceeded the growth rate 
of their exports to the industrial centres. The higher 
cost of import substitution was more than offset by 
the much bigger increment in the product. This was 
the economic justification of  import substitution, 
which, as we observed before, could have been of 
greater importance if  a more rational policy had 
been pursued.
I do not say it is just the same situation that is 
now confronting the periphery in consequence of 
the rate of  development of  the centres –so much 
lower now than in the days of buoyancy– and the 
stronger emphasis on protectionism. The periphery 
has learnt to export, and some of these exports do 
go to the centres. But, as we have already noted, 
their volume is a long way below what is required, 
especially if  development is speeded up.
There has been a significant change in the 
structure of production, but it is far from enough. 
And in so far as the centres refuse to accept more 
imports from the periphery, the latter will also have 
to gear its structure of production to satisfying by 
means of import substitution the requirements that 
cannot be met through trade.
The inference is obvious: in this crisis, as in others 
of more distant date, the centres have forced and still are 
forcing the periphery to resort to import substitution.
The difference between this crisis and those 
of  the past lies in the fact that it is now possible 
to combine the import substitution drive with the 
effort needed in order to continue expanding exports 
of manufactures.
The way in which the two types of  effort are 
combined depends primarily upon the attitude of the 
centres with respect to these industrial exports from 
the periphery. If  the endeavour to increase them 
were to encounter serious obstacles, either because 
of  the centripetal tendency of  developed-world 
capitalism or because of  the other unfavourable 
factors mentioned above, the only solution open 
to the periphery would be to give its structure of 
production a more decided slant towards import 
substitution, in order not to restrict its own rate 
of  development, or to develop more rapidly than 
would otherwise be possible. It is difficult to say 
whether the transnational corporations might in the 
event help to counteract the centripetal tendency 
by exporting advanced goods to the centres; they 
have not hitherto done so on any impressive scale, 
albeit they have played an important role in respect 
of exports to peripheral countries. And they might 
do much more still in this direction if  import 
substitution were undertaken at the regional level, 
a point to which we shall revert in due course.
This situation, together with the siphoning-off 
of peripheral income, explains how it is that while 
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at first the transnational corporations help to correct 
external disequilibrium through import substitution, 
later on they are more apt to aggravate it, in relations 
with the centres when the amount transferred abroad 
in the shape of  their profits and other payments 
exceeds their new capital contributions, while at the 
same time the possibilities of  further substitution 
are gradually being exhausted.
Nor are these the only ways in which income 
is siphoned off; there are others deriving from the 
technical and economic superiority of  the centres 
and the weight of their political power.
The disparities in the structure of production of 
course have their origin in the time-lag in peripheral 
development due to the centripetal tendency of 
capitalism in the advanced countries. Two important 
points need stressing in this connexion.
The first relates to the income-elasticity of 
the centres’ demand for primary imports from the 
periphery. This elasticity is relatively low, but for a 
few exceptions. And the periphery’s effort, in the 
days of  outward-directed growth, to expand its 
exports beyond the limit set by the development of 
the centres was –as it still is– exposed to the risk of 
‘a deterioration in the terms of trade.
To this congenital weakness in primary exports 
is added their great external vulnerability, since 
cyclical movements in the centres are transmitted 
to such exports more intensively than in the centres 
themselves.
The low income-elasticity referred to also affects 
the centres’ own primary production. And this has 
led them either deliberately to restrict production, 
as in the United States, or to restrict imports, as in 
the European Economic Community. Since these 
possibilities are not open to the periphery, the 
tendency towards a deterioration of  the terms of 
trade has caused production to be slowed up, almost 
always spontaneously, at the expense of the greater 
surplus that might have been obtained if  a larger 
proportion of the fruits of technical progress could 
have been retained in the periphery.
That is why, in the days of  outward-directed 
development, and in so far as the centres did not 
welcome industrial exports from the periphery, 
import-substituting production was the only 
road open for development. There was no other 
way of  counteracting the trend towards external 
disequilibrium generated by the great difference 
between the above-mentioned relatively low income-
elasticity of  the centres’ demand for primary 
exports from the periphery, and the relatively high 
income-elasticity of  demand in the periphery for 
the constantly-diversified industrial exports from 
the centres.
This is a transitory phase of development; but 
it is a transition that takes a long time. Conceivably, 
changes in its structure of production may enable 
the periphery to approach progressively nearer to 
external equilibrium of a structural character. This 
depends, in the last analysis, upon a favourable 
attitude on the part of the centres and upon import 
substitution at the Latin America level, as well as 
on trade with other peripheral countries.
There is certainly no lack of  economists in 
the centres who, even setting aside these structural 
phenomena in centre-periphery relations, point 
out the advantages of  importing less advanced 
goods against exports of  more advanced goods 
characterized by a high level of  productivity per 
worker. But these rational considerations do not 
suffice for the adoption of policy decisions to modify 
the structure of production both in the centres and 
in the periphery. What is more, during those years 
of booming development in the advanced countries, 
any unemployment that might have occurred in 
industries adversely affected by competition from 
the periphery could have been compensated by 
employment in those other industries and activities 
which were growing at an exceptional rate. It was 
thought preferable, however, to employ labour from 
less developed countries, a move which subsequently 
turned out to have some sort of  rationality too, 
although the form it took was not very humane: 
dismissal and repatriation of  these workers when 
the rate of development dropped.
4. Comparative advantages
In the light of these observations, fresh consideration 
should be given to certain theses which, like that of 
comparative advantages and trade reciprocity, are 
often put forward afresh without reference to the 
great disparities between the centres and the periphery 
in respect of the structure of production.
In face of the phenomena of centripetal capitalism 
and its reluctance to liberalize trade in those industrial 
goods where the periphery has the comparative 
advantages in question, the only course open to 
the latter is that of  import substitution. But this 
substitution must satisfy considerations of economic 
efficiency. How could their recommendations be 
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followed up? Needless to say, import-substituting 
domestic production, particularly during a certain 
initial phase, represents a higher cost than imports 
would, which is a comparative disadvantage. 
Accordingly, considerations of economic efficiency 
suggest that the objects of  substitution should be 
those goods in which the comparative disadvantage 
is least. That is, the direct disadvantage, for, as was 
pointed out in the relevant context, this disadvantage 
is more than offset by the increase in the product.
The situation in this respect differs widely from 
one country to another; there are some relatively 
small countries which could, for example, develop 
certain agricultural export lines without detriment 
to their terms of  trade, especially in the case of 
commodities for which, on account of their special 
attributes, there is a steady demand in the centres. 
Some industrial goods, too, have this particularity.
Similar cases may also arise in larger countries, 
but there is no reason to suppose that this is a 
general rule, and that such exports could support a 
growth rate high enough to do away with the flaws 
in the prevailing type of development.
. Trade reciprocity
While the centres do not acknowledge the 
comparative advantages of  the periphery, they 
harbour some theorists who are returning to the 
attack on import substitution, with the old thesis 
of  trade reciprocity as their weapon. According 
to this thesis, any liberalization of ’ imports from 
the periphery should be accompanied by similar 
liberalization of  the latter’s imports from the 
centres. The tendency to external disequilibrium in 
peripheral development attributable to the disparity 
in elasticities is still disregarded. And worst of 
all, these ideas, which might he supposed to have 
been discredited by the elucidation of development 
phenomena, are once again dominant in certain 
sectors in our own countries.12
In view of these ideas of cepal, which have lost 
no jot of their validity, it is surprising that in Latin 
America tariffs should actually have been lowered 
and industries exposed to ruinous competition from 
abroad, in the hope that the centres may decide to 
practice reciprocity by liberalizing imports from the 
periphery. I greatly fear that this is a hope which will 
be indefinitely deferred!
All this is only too well known in cepal. And 
if  I recall it now, it is to bring back into touch with 
reality some of our economists who live in an aseptic 
world in which they hatch their learned lucubrations. 
For instance, they talk about the internationalization 
of production and external openness. Excellent, but 
let the centres be the first to begin! Long years of 
struggle, mainly in unctad, have not succeeded in 
altering their restrictive attitude. Do those economists 
perhaps suppose it possible to move the centres to 
compassion with the spectacle of industries that are 
closing down because of external openness?
12 It seems appropriate, therefore, to recall what we said in 1963:
“The peripheral countries are in a position diametrically 
opposed to that of  the major centres with respect to trade 
reciprocity. The great industrial centres export manufactured 
goods for which demand increases sharply as income rises in 
the peripheral countries, whereas these latter export primary 
commodities for which the upward trend of  demand is more 
gradual as income rises in the major centres.”
“Thus the great centres have no need to engage in import 
substitution from this point of view, since the trade disequilibrium 
with the peripheral countries tends to be positive in their case; in 
other words, exports are in excess. On the other hand, the trend 
towards a negative imbalance in the peripheral countries compels 
them to resort to substitution within the present pattern of trade 
in order to avoid a deficit in their balance of payments.”
“Moreover, if  the major centres, for other reasons which 
may or may not be justified, embark on substitution with respect 
to imports from the peripheral countries, they aggravate this 
disparity in international demand. On the other hand, import 
substitution by the peripheral countries with respect to items 
from the major centres tends to reduce the disparity and thus 
to make development possible.”
“This basic inequality calls for a revision of the concept of 
reciprocity accepted until now, for if  the great centres reduce or 
abolish their customs tariffs, the peripheral countries can increase 
their exports to them. And if  this happens, the imports of the 
peripheral countries will also increase, in view of the buoyancy 
of demand for the goods concerned...”
“To require a developing country to grant equivalent tariff  
concessions would hamper its industrialization, to the obvious 
detriment of its economic development.”
It was next explained that the idea of implicit reciprocity did 
not imply that nothing should be done about correcting abuses 
of  protectionism. Quite the contrary... “the customs tariffs in 
force for the rest of the world must gradually be lowered, both 
in the light of economic expediency and to ensure that industry 
is constantly encouraged by external competition to narrow the 
gap in productivity vis-à-vis the major centres.”
“A reform of  this kind obviously cannot be carried out 
where an increasing bottleneck exists. Relief  must come rather 
from the external sector, in the shape of  a speeding-up in the 
tempo of the export trade. In other words, a rational customs 
tariff  must be part of an international plan to expand trade on 
new bases. Tariff  reform cannot be a prelude to such a policy, 
but must stem from it.” It should be borne in mind that this was 
written before unctad came into being.
See Towards a dynamic development policy for Latin 
America, op. cit., pp. 73-75.
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That there are certain industries which must 
either step up their productivity or disappear, is 
not open to question; they are industries which in 
view of their considerable comparative disadvantage 
ought never to have been established. But it would be 
a grave mistake to demolish them before increased 
accumulation of reproductive capital and a rise in 
the rate of  development have made it possible to 
reabsorb the labour thrown out of employment. This 
is a problem of proper timing. Advances must first 
be achieved in the structure of  production, either 
towards exporting or towards import substitution, 
with due regard to comparative advantages or 
disadvantages; and then the abuses of protectionism 
must be thoroughly set to rights. We must not 
destroy until we can build better.
6. Economic fragmentation of the periphery
In the centres the change in structure of production 
has been brisk and continuous. But no country 
has attempted intensive production of  everything 
required to meet the endless variations in demand: 
on the contrary, there has been a division of labour 
between the diverse advanced countries accompanied 
by a remarkable growth of trade, under the stimulus 
of incessant technological innovations. This has been 
the dynamic significance of  the two liberalization 
rounds which were mentioned above.
Yet the establishment of  rational forms of 
division of labour among the peripheral countries has 
been beyond their capacity. In so far as it has not been 
possible for them to export enough to the centres, 
each country has developed its industrial production 
without troubling about trade with the rest. For that 
reason it is essential that import substitution should 
be tackled at the Latin American level.
Ever since it published its first studies –in 
the early 1950s, and prior to the establishment 
of  the European Common Market–, cepal has 
drawn attention to the trend towards exhaustion 
of the easier forms of import substitution and the 
necessity of moving on to technically more complex 
production calling for markets much broader than 
the watertight compartments of  the individual 
country markets.
Hence originated the idea of a Latin American 
Common Market, based both on the progressive 
reduction of tariffs and other restrictions, and on 
industrial specialization agreements concerted by 
the governments.
The common market idea was opposed at first 
by the centres, and in particular by the United States. 
Influenced by their immediate interests, they did 
not realize the dynamic significance of  this Latin 
American undertaking.
In the end they accepted it, but they objected to 
specialization agreements, on the grounds that these 
deprived the transnational corporations of  their 
freedom to decide what best suited their interests.
I am inclined to think that this was an adverse 
factor, but what did most to discourage progress 
towards the common market was the trade boom 
brought about by the exceptional rate of development 
of  the centres. I am referring not only to the 
periphery’s trade with the centres, but also to trade 
among the various peripheral countries, which was 
powerfully stimulated by the repercussions of  the 
development process aforesaid.
Now the same import substitution problem is 
once again rearing its head in the Latin American 
scenario. I do not suppose for a moment that 
recourse should be had to the original formulas; 
too much water has flowed under the bridges! 
We must profit by the lessons of  experience and 
arrive at formulas which, inter alia, may ensure the 
equitable distribution of  advantages alike for the 
more developed countries of the region and for the 
less developed and those at an intermediate stage.
The economic fragmentation of our countries 
must be brought to an end. This is another of’ the 
manifestations of the time-lag in their development 
caused by the centripetal nature of capitalism; each 
of the peripheral countries made its contribution to 
the supply of primary commodities separately from 
the rest. And when industrialization supervened as a 
result of the crisis in the centres, we were not capable 
of breaking down the old centre-periphery pattern 
by means of a rational division of labour.
This pattern still largely governs inter-Latin 
American relations. To change it becomes essential 
now that the myth of the unlimited expansion of 
capitalism has again been dispelled. Moreover, even 
if  the centres were to pursue a more favourable 
policy towards peripheral imports, we could hardly 
pour into their markets all the exports required to 
satisfy the dynamic exigencies of’ development and 
the transformation of the system.
7. hegemony and dependence
The time-lag with which the periphery embarked 
upon its integrated development –based on 
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industrialization– is strikingly reflected in the 
economic and technical superiority of the centres, 
particularly the chief  dynamic centre of capitalism. 
And that superiority has economic and political 
effects between which a distinction should be drawn, 
although the two are closely related and evolve under 
the hegemony of the centres.
This hegemony affects the peripheral countries 
in different ways and degrees, as the centres exert 
themselves to promote and defend their economic, 
political and strategic interests. And in its direct 
exercise the centres have powerful instruments to use: 
financial, economic and technological co-operation, 
as well as military aid.
The transnational corporations, apart from 
pursuing their own objectives, are usually effective 
agents of this hegemony. The centres promote their 
penetration into different branches of  domestic 
activity in the periphery; and the transnationals, 
in their turn, support in one way or another the 
hegemonic interests of  the centres. Where their 
own interests are concerned, the transnational 
corporations wield a twofold influence. They exercise 
it both in the centres and in the periphery; on 
the mass communications media, on the political 
movements which support the system and on the 
governments. And in the centres there is, in addition, 
a whole constellation of  interests which have an 
impact on the periphery and its governments.
All this goes to form the notorious relations 
of  dependence, in degrees of  intensity that differ 
according to the countries’ ability to defend their 
autonomy. Dependence makes a peripheral country 
do what otherwise it would not, and refrain from 
doing what otherwise it would. And its bargaining 
capacity is limited.
Dependence is never more strikingly apparent 
than when a peripheral country acts in a manner 
counter to the centres’ hegemonic interests, especially 
that of  the leading centre. All the aforesaid 
constellation of interests is then mobilized against 
it, and it is penalized by measures of  one sort or 
another which in the past –and not so very long ago 
at that– have culminated in military operations.
There are some economists and sociologists 
who extend the concept of dependence to all centre-
periphery relations. There would be no harm in 
this if  they were to analyse clearly the Different 
implications of the centripetal nature of capitalism, 
as we have tried to do in the preceding pages. Often, 
however, this does not happen; which is why I have 
exerted myself  here to shed further light on its 
consequences, at the risk of repeating what has been 
said in other studies.
Furthermore, some have gone so far as to 
maintain that dependence, however it may be 
interpreted, is responsible for underdevelopment. 
Translated into our idiom, this means that the poverty 
of the broad masses excluded from development must 
have been generated by the action of the centres.
Nothing is gained in the field of theory, or in 
that of praxis either, by assertions of this sort; which 
by no means implies that they are not efficacious in 
political indoctrination.
A distinction must be drawn between the 
existence of poverty and its persistence. When the 
technique of the centres began to penetrate into the 
periphery’s export activities, much of the population 
was living in poverty, and this poverty has gradually 
diminished with the spread of technique to activities 
in other fields. But the fruits of  that technique, 
instead of  being fully capitalized, have served to 
promote the privileged-consumer society and the 
siphoning-off of income by the centres, thus giving 
rise to the exclusive tendency of  the system, the 
explanation of  which need not be repeated here. 
Hence the persistence of poverty, aggravated by rapid 
population growth.
The centres and the existing relations of 
dependence do not create poverty, but because of the 
centripetal nature of capitalism they do help to make 
it last. It might be said that this happens precisely 
because the myth of  the worldwide expansion of 
capitalism has never become a reality. If  it had, very 
serious harm would undoubtedly have been done to 
the autonomy of the periphery, shaky though this 
may be as things are.
Again, the periphery has not lacked believers 
in the possibility that the transnational corporations 
might turn the myth into fact. But of course this has 
not happened, owing, once again, to the centripetal 
tendencies of  capitalism. As we have said before, 
at the international level there are no factors that 
spontaneously lead to the counteraction of  these 
trends. The transnationals have a different outlook, 
and they could not be expected to change their attitude 
on their own accord in order to help the periphery to 
carry technique deeper into its social structure.
But is the periphery itself  doing this? Is it 
making thorough use of  the capital accumulation 
potential deriving from its technical progress in order 
to absorb at rising levels of productivity the lower 
strata that are vegetating in a state of penury? The 
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interests of the fortunate members of the privileged-
consumer society stand in the way.
The inference is conclusive: the mere interplay 
of  private interests, however legitimate they may 
be, could never change the limited dynamics of 
the privileged-consumer society or the centripetal 
character of capitalism. These are, at bottom, largely 
structural problems which call for major political 
decisions both in the centres and in the periphery.
But the centres are passing through a crisis 
which makes it much more difficult for them to adopt 
such decisions; and the same thing is happening in 
the periphery. In the next section we shall attempt 
to single out the main elements in this crisis.
VII
The crisis of capitalism in its leading dynamic 
centre and its repercussions on the periphery
1. A preliminary survey
The present crisis of  capitalism is very complex, 
and harder to resolve than the great depression of 
the 1930s.
It is, in my opinion, a crisis which the very 
vigour of capitalism has brought about. Capitalism 
has overreached itself; if  has overflowed its own 
banks, and has not yet discovered how to channel 
development back into its regular course.
I have endeavoured to understand these 
phenomena, which, apart from their enormous 
importance for the centres, have severe repercussions 
on the periphery. I am looking at them from the 
periphery, at a distance, and my interpretation is 
open to errors which, I hope, will be no worse than 
those often perpetrated by some who, speaking from 
the centres, pronounce incautious judgements on 
the periphery.
Prior to the difficulties of  recent times, there 
was an exceptional rise in productivity and the global 
product in the United States, whose repercussions 
made themselves internationally felt. This fact, 
however, incorporated an element of falsity, since the 
productivity in question had been mainly achieved 
by virtue of  techniques which depredated non 
renewable natural resources and which, in addition, 
caused a serious deterioration of the environment. 
The natural capital of  the biosphere was being 
gradually swallowed up.
Growing  requ i rement s  in  re spec t  o f 
consumption, investment and State expenditure 
accompanied this increase in the product, while 
its allocation was not guided by any criterion of 
compatibility. Moreover, largely because of  the 
inflation stemming from state expenditure, these 
requirements came to outstrip the growth of  the 
product, and have been covered at the expense of 
the product of  the rest of  the world, in exchange 
for currencies which have internationally propagated 
inflation; and to all this have been added the effects 
of  the upswing in the cost of  petroleum.
The rectification of  this element of  falsity in 
the dynamics of development will call for large-scale 
investment which, despite its positive ecological 
and social significance, will not bring with it new 
increases in productivity. Thus average productivity 
will decline.
This downward trend will combine with that 
already occurring both because of  the organic 
evolution of  the system and because of  certain 
investments which, by reason of  their nature and 
volume, were also depressing productivity.
The system is faced with an incontrovertible 
reality. The illusion of a prosperity achieved at the 
expense of the biosphere has vanished; and so has 
the illusion of the limitless power of the dollar.
That the system has immense vitality is beyond 
question. But a transition period would be needed, 
at present of  indeterminate length, to introduce 
major adjustments in it with a view to remedying 
its distortions.
Both technique and capital accumulation will 
need to be reoriented. But to generate capital when 
productivity is falling poses a new and difficult 
problem for capitalist development: a problem 
which becomes more serious still if  inflation is to 
be eliminated.
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There will be no escaping a reduction of  the 
rate of  consumption, in a country accustomed to 
its constant expansion. But it would seem that as 
yet no clear awareness exists of what the hard facts 
will enforce.
Nor is this all. Over and over again I wonder 
whether the current accumulation and distribution 
mechanisms are adequate for the solution of those 
problems. All the more, inasmuch as the evolution 
of  the system was already showing symptoms of 
disturbance.
We will now enlarge upon the ideas which have 
just been so briefly set forth.13
2. Exceptional productivity at the expense of 
the biosphere
It is now possible to obtain a clearer insight than 
before into the capitalist development of  the 
centres. The exceptional impetus of  the last few 
decades, up to recent times, was the effect not 
only of  impressive technical progress, but also of 
the irrational exploitation of  natural resources, 
especially energy, which, in turn, markedly influenced 
the orientation of  techniques; whence the above-
mentioned element of  falsity, with its dramatic 
implications for the world.
In all this a role of  decisive importance has 
been played by the hegemonic power of the centres, 
especially the United States, in the periphery of the 
world economy. The petroleum-exporting countries 
were not strong enough to make a stand against the 
centres’ hegemony, although they had long been 
clearly aware that the non-renewable resource in 
question was being squandered; but any attempt 
on their part to restrain this insensate exploitation 
would have come up against tough opposition.
The exporter countries could concertedly 
restrict the expansion of  production only in a 
international conjuncture which enabled them to 
acquire power themselves and so face up to the 
power of the centres.
A little thought will show the irrationality in 
the use of petroleum resulting from the application 
of  new techniques and the profit incentive of  the 
oil firms was propagated throughout the whole 
system. The low cost of  petroleum considerably 
influenced technological research, channelling it 
towards extremely abusive forms of  utilization 
of  this non-renewable good, as well as of  other 
natural resources; all this being fostered by the 
unequal distribution of the fruits of the increasing 
productivity of technique, given the nature of the 
social structure and the changes in it.
But this is not the whole story. It is only in recent 
times that technological research has concerned itself  
at all with the harm inflicted by technique on the 
environment. Such is the ambivalence of technique: 
its immense contribution to human welfare by virtue 
of the continuous increase in productivity, and, at 
the same time, its serious effects on the biosphere.
Philosophists and humanists have been devoting 
themselves for some time past to the psychosocial 
implications of  technology, but economists have 
generally been unwilling to take its ambivalence 
into account in their interpretation of development 
phenomena. They have regarded it as an exogenous 
element like the political, social and cultural aspects 
of reality. In their concern for a peculiar doctrinal 
asepsis, they have withstood the incorporation of 
these elements, and of their mutual interrelationships, 
into the dynamics of development.
3. Requirements incompatible with the growth 
of the product
We were saying that in the chief  dynamic centre 
of  capitalism the product, notwithstanding its 
exceptional rate of growth, had not been sufficient 
to meet requirements which were competing with 
one another for an increasing share in it. These 
requirements derived from the growing volume of 
domestic and foreign investment, from the boom 
in private consumption and from the considerable 
expansion of State services, including social services 
and military expenditure.
This increase in State expenditure was to a great 
extent inflationary. The State, for understandable 
political reasons, was reluctant to step up taxation, 
preferring to resort to monetary expansion in order 
to cover the fiscal deficit. Even if  it had done so, 
however, the consequences would have still been 
largely inflationary. If the additional tax burden had 
fallen, in one way or another, on the labour force, it 
would have tried to recoup itself by wage increases at 
the expense of the economic surplus, and that would 
have entailed a rise in prices. Enterprises would have 
defended themselves similarly if  taxes had been 
13 In the following pages I have made use of part of the paper 
on “Biosfera y desarrollo”, op. cit.
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levied directly on the surplus, to the detriment of 
capital accumulation.
In any event, the inflationary financing of the 
deficit caused prices to rise; and the subsequent wage 
adjustments considerably intensified the inflationary 
spiral which had already been developing to a 
moderate extent. And to all this has now been added 
the fresh impetus given to inflation by the energy 
crisis and the protection of the environment.
These various pressures have been eased, however, 
thanks to the fact that part of  the inflationary 
expansion of demand due to the fiscal deficit could be 
satisfied by increasing imports: that is, at the expense 
of the gross product of the rest of the world. The 
dimensions of this situation, aggravated as it has been 
by the growing volume of petroleum imports and the 
considerable rise in their value, have been appreciably 
affected by the regressive income distribution which 
has accompanied inflation. There has been a boom in 
imports of those goods which are in greatest demand 
among the social groups favoured by inflation, 
principally to the detriment of the consumption of 
those social groups which have less redistributive and 
defensive power.
This growth of  imports in excess of  exports 
and other external resources has been the most 
important factor in the United States’ chronic 
balance-of-payments deficit. To this must be added 
the transnational corporations’ investments abroad, 
in so far as they have not been covered by the 
enterprises’ own external profits.
To put this in another way, the expansion of 
state expenditure has not been covered at the expense 
of  consumption –except for the consumption of 
the disadvantaged social groups– but has been 
superimposed upon it and on private investment. 
And the consequent excess of  demand in relation 
to the domestic product has spilled outwards, and 
has been met with imports.
4. organic decline in productivity
To understand the decline in productivity which 
takes place in the advanced stages of  capitalist 
development, the two ways in which it is manifested 
must be taken into account: the technological 
innovations which are continually incorporated into 
the system, on the one hand; and, on the other, the 
improvement in productivity which occurs as a result 
of the displacement of labour from lower-productivity 
occupations to others where productivity is higher.
As capital accumulation in the shape of physical 
goods and education of human beings increases, the 
proportion of the labour force employed at lower 
levels of  productivity progressively decreases. In 
other words, there is a trend towards homogenization 
of technique and productivity, with significant effects 
on income.
The operation of this tendency will bring down 
the average productivity of  the system unless the 
rate of productivity of the new capital accumulation 
necessitated by the innovations is stepped up. This 
improvement would be needed to offset the effect 
of the homogenization of technique.
But there is something much more important. 
As has been explained elsewhere, the productivity 
increment stemming from the accumulation of 
reproductive capital encourages the ceaseless 
diversification of  goods and services via the 
accumulation of consumptive capital. The techniques 
concerned, while they do not increase productivity, 
improve the efficiency of the goods and their capacity 
to satisfy new requirements or considerations of social 
status and conspicuous consumption.
These techniques, like the corresponding 
accumulation, are closely combined, of course, with 
those that improve productivity, but as this happens 
the proportion of  consumptive capital gradually 
increases, prejudicially to reproductive capital. This 
is a logical consequence of the organic evolution of 
the system: there would be no sense in increasing 
productivity if  it meant continually adding to the 
available supply of the same goods and services, since 
obviously this reduces the rate of productivity.
Consequently, the rate of  average productivity 
decreases both because of  the effects of  the 
homogenization of technique on the displacement of 
labour, and because a steadily increasing proportion 
of the labour force is thus displaced and is diverted, 
along with the corresponding capital accumulation, 
into satisfying the more and more decided bent of 
demand towards the diversification of  goods and 
services in which efficiency is heightened rather 
than productivity.
It is sometimes said that the fall in average 
productivity is due to the progressive increase in the 
proportion of skilled services in relation to goods; 
this is true, but it does not suffice to account for the 
phenomenon. For, as has just been shown, there is 
also an increase in the proportion of goods which 
are diversified and in which techniques improves 
efficiency rather than productivity.
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It was stated above that diversification is a 
consequence of  the growing productivity of  the 
system; but considerable influence is also exercised 
by the distribution of ’ the fruits of  productivity. 
Thus, the social strata favoured by distribution 
tend to increase their demand for diversified 
goods and services much more intensively than the 
disadvantaged strata, whose demand is concentrated 
on goods where diversification is slight. This state 
of affairs is aggravated by the regressive effects of 
inflation, and sharpens the downward trend in the 
average productivity of the system.
Lastly, to all this must be added a very important 
factor: capital accumulation for the purpose of 
producing weapons of  war. Obviously, this type 
of accumulation also contributes to the decline of 
average productivity, although it must no be forgotten 
that innovations in armaments technology have 
greatly influenced other innovations in the system.
If  we have dwelt on this subject, although 
somewhat schematically, the reason lies in its great 
importance for understanding the incidence of the 
decline in productivity on the economic surplus, which 
represents the dynamic mechanism of the system; 
and also for grasping the complexity of the major 
adjustments which the crisis of the system necessitates, 
especially in the leading centre of capitalism.
. The surplus and the decline in productivity
In the discussion of peripheral capitalism we have 
attributed paramount importance to the structural 
phenomenon of the surplus, which has also made 
its appearance in the historical development of 
capitalism in the centres. But in these latter, the trend 
towards homogenization noted above gradually 
reduces the surplus formed by successive productivity 
increments. The steeper this trend, and the greater 
the concomitant decrease in the proportion of the 
labour force occupied at lower levels of technique, 
the stronger becomes the workers’ spontaneous 
ability to obtain better pay.
But at the same time the labour force has been 
developing its trade-union and political power, so 
that its pressure on the surplus steadily increases. 
Similarly, direct or indirect pressure on the surplus 
is also exerted by the intensive development of State 
services. Thus the surplus is subject to the effects 
of  two opposite movements: on the one hand, 
new productivity increments, and, on the other, 
the twofold pressure of  the State and the labour 
force. There is nothing in the system to regulate this 
double pressure.
This being the case, a stage is reached in 
the evolution of  the system at which the twofold 
pressure in question prevents the surplus –especially 
that pertaining to the upper strata in the social 
structure– from playing its dynamic role. For the 
combined pressure of  the State and the labour 
force is detrimental to the capital accumulation 
and the consumption of  the strata referred to, 
notwithstanding further increases in productivity. 
Sooner or later the enterprises where these strata 
prevail raise their prices, in order to reanimate the 
growth of  the surplus or, alternatively, of  their 
profits, if  in this skeleton outline of  a complex 
phenomenon I may be allowed to identify profits 
with the surplus.
When the labour force acquires a great deal of 
trade-union and political power, as has happened in the 
centres, the rise in prices is followed by wage increases. 
This is the meaning of the inflationary spiral.
I am inclined to think that the spiral which 
was developing in the United States before the fiscal 
deficit became very large was the consequence of the 
phenomena described. In the foregoing argument we 
have preferred to sacrifice rigour to simplicity.
6. The requirements of the crisis and the 
accumulation and distribution regime
Everything suggests that in the leading centre, as in 
the others, the growth rate of productivity and the 
product will sink appreciably lower than in those 
years when it was exceptionally high. Accordingly, 
there will be a period of transition, after the major 
adjustments required in the system, as to the duration 
of which it would be unsafe to hazard an opinion. 
It may be, however, that important technological 
innovations, or full utilization of recent ones, may 
push up productivity again without those elements 
of falsity that we indicated at the outset.
But the progressive elimination of these elements 
of falsity calls for heavy investment. A new type of 
accumulation in respect of energy and protection of 
the environment will then proportionally increase in 
relation to reproductive accumulation. While this .is 
a form of accumulation of enormous importance, 
it will not immediately raise the productivity of 
the system; on the contrary, it will accentuate the 
downward trend of the rate of average productivity 
and of the growth rate of the global product.
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Let us consider the incidence of  these facts. 
The fall in the growth rate of  the product will 
inevitably enforce a correlative decline in the rate 
of  consumption, for if  instead of  this the rate 
of  accumulation were reduced the product would 
decrease more rapidly still.
This adverse effect on consumption would pose 
a difficult social and political problem. Which social 
groups would be affected by these adjustments? What 
mechanisms has the system to put them into effect?
First and foremost, it should be borne in mind 
that investment relating to the biosphere represents a 
higher cost per unit of product, which the enterprises 
will transfer to prices. Petroleum prices have soared in 
immediate response to the increased cost of imports, 
and a similar upward trend will be progressively 
reflected in an appreciable rise in the cost of  new 
sources of energy. Accordingly, given the power of 
the labour force, wage increases will ensue, with the 
consequent endeavour on the part of enterprises to 
protect their surplus by raising prices yet again. Will 
there be any way of avoiding this?
Clearly, if  the labour force had only incipient 
trade-union power, or none at all, there would be 
no reason for this further rise in prices to supervene, 
with the consequent initiation or increase in the 
momentum of  the inflationary spiral. The spiral 
is, in reality, the result of  a confrontation of 
powers. Monetary policy can prevent it only if  the 
unfavourable effects on employment produced by a 
restriction of the money supply weaken the trade-
union and political power of the labour force and the 
play of market forces brings down wages. I do not 
think that this is the case in the United States, where 
the said trade-union and political power, despite 
unemployment, strives to offset the rise in prices 
with wage increases. What is more, wages will follow 
an upward trend, if  the incidence of  petroleum 
is combined with the operation of  other factors 
that force up prices, among them the inflationary 
effects of subsidies to the unemployed and of other 
State expenditure. This is the new phenomenon 
of  stagflation, an unmistakable symptom of  the 
changes that have occurred in power relations.
The problem could be temporarily resolved if  
the labour force were to refrain from compensating 
for the rise in prices with wage increases. That 
would be the aim of those who advocate some kind 
of social pact. But consider what this means. This 
sacrifice of income, with the consequent constraints 
on consumption, would be endured in order to 
enable the privileged social strata to continue 
stepping up their own accumulation. Could this 
conceivably be a lasting solution?
Clearly, if  the labour force were to offset these 
unfavourable effects by its own accumulation, 
the accumulation process would continue; the 
same might be said if  the State were to fulfil this 
compensatory role. But obviously that is not how 
the system functions.
From these explanations a conclusion of  the 
greatest importance can be drawn, and should 
be emphasized. The machinery for appropriation 
and retention of the surplus constituted a rational 
response to the dynamic requirements of the system 
in a social structure in which the economic, social 
and political power of the upper strata was virtually 
unchallenged. But it is no longer rational when, as 
a result of the changes in the social structure, the 
trade-union and political power of the labour force 
develops and gains strength, and State services are 
considerably expanded.
Moreover, this machinery does not seem 
designed to enable enterprises to absorb the aforesaid 
higher production costs by cramping their surplus, 
for therein lies the dynamic mechanism of  the 
system, as we have said elsewhere. Unquestionably 
a very sensitive mechanism, and also of  great 
importance because of the political power of those 
who have it in their control, and who mainly belong 
to the upper strata.
I have no possible means of  quantifying the 
dimensions of this complex problem. Perhaps they 
are not disproportionate in relation to the high level 
of personal consumption in the United States; but 
this is only one factor in the problem, since the 
consumer society, which has spread throughout the 
whole of  the social structure, although with wide 
disparities, has gained remarkable momentum. But 
this impetus will be impossible to keep up, at any 
rate during a very difficult transition period.
Difficult, not only because of the internal factors 
that come into play; for the euphoria generated by 
the consumer society in question and the large scale 
of State expenditure have been attained not merely 
thanks to the exceptional increase in productivity 
–which has been followed by a marked decline– but 
at the expense of  the product of  the rest of  the 
world, as we have already pointed out. This is linked 
to another of the great illusions which is now being 
dispelled: the might of the dollar. The time has come 
to deal with this question.
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7. Reflections on the might of the dollar
The crisis in the leading dynamic centre of capitalism 
is also a crisis in the financial ascendancy of  the 
United States, finding dramatic expression in the 
depreciation of  the dollar, the use of  which as 
an international currency has signified a great 
advantage and an enormous responsibility for the 
United States.
The great advantage is that of  seigniorage, 
i.e., the benefit resulting from the creation of  its 
own currency in response to the development of 
world trade. This implicitly involved responsibility 
for regulating the issuance of  that currency in 
the light of  internationally meaningful as well as 
internal considerations.
This responsibility was fairly effectively 
discharged prior to the inflation caused mainly 
by the fiscal deficit. But in the end the deficit has 
disrupted the whole international monetary system, 
and on top of this have come the effects of the rise 
in petroleum prices. And seigniorage has turned into 
that gigantic transfer to the United States of part of 
the increase in the world product to which reference 
was made in earlier pages of this same chapter.
The serious implications of the use of the dollar 
as an international currency had long been perceived. 
An eminent Yale professor, Robert Triffin, drew 
attention to them with admirable persistence.14
In the United States the illusion of the almighty 
dollar held sway. Perhaps it was partly on account 
of  this illusion that recourse was had to internal 
monetary expansion to cover the colossal expenditure 
on the war in Vietnam which was superimposed on 
the heavy social expenditure of President Johnson’s 
“Great Society”. The notorious unpopularity of 
the war made it difficult to resort to borrowing or 
taxation to finance it. In fact, what was the point of 
doing so, if instead of casting the whole burden of its 
cost on domestic consumption, the issuance of dollars 
made it possible to appropriate part of the product 
of the rest of the world at no expense?
Outside the United States, then, there was an 
overwhelming flood of dollars. Great international 
liquidity was what it was called at the time: a 
euphemism which certainly does nothing to mitigate 
the serious consequences of this state of affairs.
But matters did not stop there, since the dollars 
thus floating multiplied their inflationary effects in 
the Eurodollar market. Dollar deposits in favour of 
countries with a surplus were used to issue loans to 
other countries, so that to their original deposits new 
ones were added, with the result that the inflationary 
pressure was exacerbated.
These operations seem similar to those that 
occur within a country as the result of an increase in 
the money supply issued by the Central Bank. There 
is a great difference, however, for whereas the latter 
has the means of  regulating the multiplier effects 
of  this initial issue of  money, no such regulatory 
mechanism exists in the Eurodollar market.
Thus matters have reached the pitch of  a 
veritable monetary aberration, which, besides 
producing the effects referred to above, vitiates 
internal monetary policy.
It must be admitted, however, that not 
everything has been negative in the Eurodollar 
market; Eurodollars have played a useful role in 
helping to cope with the external disequilibria 
resulting from the sudden upswing in petroleum 
prices. As the International Monetary Fund was not 
prepared to meet requirements of  such unwonted 
size, the countries affected obtained financing from 
the Eurodollar market. Thus they were able to avoid 
restricting imports of other goods essential for the 
maintenance of their economic activity.
Recourse was also had to this market’s facilities 
by the socialist countries of  Eastern Europe, in 
which military expenditure absorbs a considerable 
proportion of the global product. In the Soviet Union, 
for instance, this proportion is estimated at between 
12 and 13%, that is, about twice the corresponding 
percentage in the United States. Obviously such 
figures are incompatible with the very widespread 
aspiration to increase the population’s consumption 
and the necessary investment. Accordingly, these 
countries have resorted to the Eurodollar market.
It is certainly paradoxical that the inflation 
largely brought about by the military expenditure of 
the United States has helped to ease, in some measure, 
the financing of the same type of expenditure in the 
socialist sphere.
At all events, the United States has continued 
to launch dollars into the world in order to deal 
with the aggravation of its external deficit resulting 
from the rise in petroleum prices. This preference 
14 See “The international role of  the dollar”, Foreign Affairs, 
Vol. 57, No. 2, Winter 1978-1979, an article in which Professor 
Triffin, in face of  the international monetary chaos, expresses 
his regret at the evidence that his timely and severe warnings 
went unheeded.
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is readily explicable, since if  it had resorted to the 
Eurodollar market it would have had to pay interest 
on its loans, like the other debtor countries. In any 
event, this further issue of money and its multiplier 
effects have increased inflationary pressure at the 
world level.
There can be no doubt that this monetary 
expansion was essential to avert serious world 
contraction, but neither is it open to question that 
the funds thus created could have been withdrawn 
from circulation, not in the form of deposits as in 
the Eurodollar market, but by investing them in 
international securities which would have averted the 
multiplier effects of the original expansion. However, 
the International Monetary Fund was not prepared 
for operations of this kind either.
Obviously, such operations would be stopgaps, 
maintained only until the deficit countries could 
expand their exports sufficiently to cover the increase 
in the cost of their petroleum imports.
From another standpoint, the United States 
has urged the need for countries with a surplus to 
increase their imports from it in order to assist in 
the correction of its deficit. For this to happen, the 
countries in question would have had to expand 
their credit on the basis of  their augmented 
monetary reserves, and this would have accentuated 
the effects of  the inflation of  external origin. It 
is understandable, therefore, that the pursuit of  a 
cautious monetary policy should have been thought 
preferable. Otherwise, the countries with a surplus 
would have returned to the United States dollars 
that had previously left it. But just as the exodus 
of these dollars alleviated the internal inflationary 
pressure by spreading it outwards, their conversion 
into demand for imports would have intensified it. 
Whereby a very old truth is confirmed: the only way 
to cure the effects of  inflation caused by a fiscal 
deficit is to prevent it!
It has just been remarked that the countries with 
a surplus had opted for a restrictive monetary policy. 
In its endeavour to curb inflation the United States 
has had to follow suit. In both cases the growth of 
the product that could otherwise have been achieved 
is being sacrificed. This is the counterproductive 
dynamic effect of having covered the fiscal deficit by 
inflationary means: the aggravation of its incidence 
on a product which is shrinking!
In any event, there can be no doubt that the 
increasing severity of inflation in the United States 
not only steadily amplified the internal inflationary 
spiral but externally touched off  the petroleum 
spiral. The original increase in petroleum prices was 
of course influenced by the inflation that had already 
been developing. The price rise intensified this 
inflation and the deterioration in the international 
value of  the dollar. Thus oil prices were eroded 
again, and so was the value of  the considerable 
dollar holdings of the petroleum exporters. And this, 
of course, led the latter to raise prices yet again. It 
can thus be seem that just as the capacity of  the 
labour force to recoup itself  from the adverse effects 
of  inflation pushes up the internal spiral, so the 
power recently gained by the oil-exporting countries 
enables them too to recoup them selves and so give 
impetus to the international spiral.
8. Incidence of the crisis on the periphery
The non-petroleum-exporting peripheral countries 
are severely affected by the rise in oil prices as well 
as by the inflationary increase in the prices of their 
imports from the centres.
It would be difficult for them to recoup 
themselves for this deterioration in their terms of 
trade by raising the prices of their exports, subject 
as these are to a relatively low income-elasticity of 
demand at the international level.
Accordingly, the periphery will have to step up 
its effort in the field of  exports of  manufactures, 
where it has acquired well-attested ability. But it 
would be idle to hope that this would suffice to 
counteract the resurgence of  the trend towards 
external disequilibrium, now aggravated by the fall in 
the growth rate of the centres and the recrudescence 
of protectionism on their part.
In face of  this situation, import substitution 
has once again become inevitable, as it was during 
other crises in the centres, especially in the Great 
Depression. It is not a question of  doctrinal 
preferences, but a necessity imposed by the 
international circumstances.
For obvious reasons of  economic viability, 
import substitution should not continue in those 
watertight compartments which cepal has been 
impugning since its earliest days. Now more than 
ever is it essential to conduct the process rationally at 
the Latin American level and on a basis of formulas 
for trade with other developing countries.
But all this takes time, and in the meanwhile 
the external imbalance will still have to be faced. 
Clearly, continued recourse to borrowing in the 
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Eurocurrency market is not the best solution; but 
there is no other, as long as the petroleum-exporting 
countries fail to adopt compensatory measures 
in favour of  the countries hardest hit by the high 
oil prices –a step that has long been canvassed. In 
reality, the proportion of petroleum consumed by 
these countries is not very large, albeit that would 
not excuse them, if compensatory arrangements were 
to be introduced, from adopting stringent energy-
saving measures.
The adverse implications of  all this for the 
periphery cannot be exaggerated. Its rate of 
development has declined, although less than it 
would have done without borrowing. The days of 
prosperity when the annual growth rate averaged 
more than 7% have come to an end.
It must be remembered, however, that even this 
rate was insufficient from the dynamic standpoint. 
A recent cepal analysis15 maintains that in order 
to absorb the increment in the labour force a rate of 
7.5% would be necessary. So the tendency to exclude 
from development the broad masses relegated to 
the lower strata of the social structure would still 
persist; and the conflictive tendencies of the system 
would be exacerbated.
What is the significance of these phenomena? 
Truly grave, which makes the social use of  the 
surplus a yet more imperative need. But there is no 
room for illusion as to the possibility of so radical a 
change, since the tasks of doctrinal persuasion and 
political preparation are bound to take a fairly long 
time. However, in any event, it would seem inevitable 
to restrict privileged consumption, not only in order 
to increase capital accumulation, but also to lighten 
the incidence of  external price increases on the 
broad masses of the population. This objective could 
hardly be attained by intensifying inflation!
It must be borne in mind, however, that as long 
as the trend towards external disequilibrium is not 
counteracted the effort to increase capital accumulation 
might be at least partially frustrated. It is not enough 
to accumulate more; there must also be a possibility of 
using the resources concerned for imports of capital 
goods which, at least for the time being, could not be 
obtained through peripheral trade.
In the light of  these considerations, the need 
for financial resources from abroad for accumulation 
purposes is obvious. No very meaningful co-
operation can be expected of the centres during the 
transition period which will be required to overcome 
the crisis. On the other hand, Eurocurrency loans 
cannot indefinitely take the place of financing from 
the international credit institutions. Such institutions, 
particularly if certain reforms in them are introduced, 
might constitute an appropriate mechanism for 
channelling large volumes of  financial resources 
accruing from petroleum which are at present used in 
the Eurocurrency market or revert to the centres.
Little progress has been made in channelling 
these resources into the periphery, either via the 
credit institutions or directly through investment 
placed by the petroleum-exporting countries 
themselves.16 This would be the best way of ensuring 
that funds would revert to the centres, in the form 
of  payment for imports of  capital goods effected 
by the periphery with the resources in question: a 
three-cornered reversion.
In this connexion, additions may be expected 
to certain proposals for setting up multinational 
enterprises among Latin American countries, 
petroleum-exporting countries and other developing 
countries; these multinationals might play a very 
important role in collective import substitution, 
especially in respect of capital goods and intermediate 
goods of some technical complexity. This would open 
up the possibility of  advantageous participation 
on the part of  the centres, in accordance with 
appropriate rules of the game.
9. The process of change in the periphery and 
relations with the centres
From all that has been said it is clear that even 
if  the forces of  democracy were to succeed in 
transforming the system in the periphery, they 
would be powerless to change on their own account 
the nature of  relations with the centres. It is not 
enough to demonstrate the incongruity of  these 
relations and their adverse effects on the periphery. 
Perhaps in the end the disasters overtaking the 
biosphere may convince the centres that the exercise 
of  their hegemonic power and the free play of 
economic forces at the international level are 
intensifying the exclusive and conflictive tendencies 
15 Latin America and the New International Development 
Strategy: goals and objectives” (E/CEPAL/L.210), Santiago, Chile, 
mimeographed text, 1979.
16 At the time of  writing, news is being cabled of  important 
decisions which the petroleum-exporting countries would seem 
to be prepared to adopt.
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of development in the periphery, with very serious 
political consequences; but the periphery lacks the 
power to do so. Power it certainly has to disrupt, 
but not to transform!
Only a long-term view could lead the centres 
to face up to their world responsibilities; they 
might play a supremely important role in the 
process of change. Accomplishing it is the business 
of  the periphery: accomplishing it and deciding 
how to do so. But the centres for their part could 
make a notable contribution to the success of the 
transformation and also –plain speaking is called 
for here– to its political significance.
But what interest could the centres have in 
performing this role? They have played their cards 
in favour of the privileged society, almost invariably 
prompted by their short-term interests. Now they see 
evidence that the basis of this type of development 
is social inequity. And perhaps they may also be 
bringing themselves to believe that in the advanced 
stages of  development the privileged-consumer 
society can only be maintained by the real or 
potential exercise of force.
Social  equity,  genuine democracy and 
unequivocal respect for human rights are values 
that have struck deep root in the centres, after 
many historical vicissitudes. It is understandable 
therefore that signs of anxiety and disconcertment 
should be shown when those great human values 
are trifled with in the periphery. But this does not 
prevent the transnationals from displaying their 
skill in accommodating themselves to such political 
apostasies, if  not actually exalting the merits of a 
complete eclipse of democracy!
VIII
Ethics, rationality and foresight
1. human welfare: privilege and utopia
For the first time in life on this earth the prodigious 
development of  technique offers us immense 
potentialities for human welfare –and human dignity 
too–, which are not unattended by pernicious effects. 
We are on the brink of  the materialization of  a 
utopia; yet these potentialities are being wrecked by 
the ambivalence noted earlier and by the privilege 
inherent in the social structure of the periphery, as 
well as in its patterns of linkage with the centres.
It is the privilege that has existed from time 
immemorial: throughout the long history of the human 
race, the fortunate life of the few has always been based 
on the wearisome toil and the social subjection of the 
many, barely alleviated by a rudimentary technique, 
evolving in the past at a snail’s pace.
In real i ty,  g iven those condit ions,  no 
substantial results could be expected in respect of 
income redistribution; nor, of  course, a dynamic 
redistribution. Poverty seemed unassailable. And 
one may wonder whether western civilization would 
have flourished as it did without inequality. Did not 
Plato and Aristotle, and so many others, defend 
slavery? Without inequality, could the splendour 
of  art and literature, of  philosophy and science, 
ever have flashed out so vividly, in brilliant though 
fleeting episodes of human talent?
Be this as it may, the significance of privilege 
has radically altered, since it now represents a 
formidable obstacle to the materialization of  that 
utopia of human welfare; a stumbling-block in the 
way of  access for all to the conquests of  culture; 
a bar to the exaltation of  the abundant creative 
talent which is going to waste because of the social 
relegation of the disadvantaged.
2. The ethics of development
This is the privilege of the surplus. To whom does 
the surplus pertain? There is no scientific reply to this 
question, for the answer is ethical. By virtue of its 
origin and nature, the surplus belongs to the whole 
community and should serve the collective interest.
Without a measure of  ethical consensus 
political movements in the direction of  change 
will never acquire lasting vigour. But neither could 
they attain their objectives without rationality –a 
rationality ultimately imposed by the evolution and 
ambivalence of technique.
Two centuries of belief in the regulatory virtues 
of  market laws have also helped to smother the 
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ethics of  development. It is forgotten that Adam 
Smith was a professor of ethics before he wrote his 
monumental work; and indeed, in all his arguments 
there is an underlying ethic, as there is in the 
neoclassical doctrine which has followed after him. 
All this has come to nothing.
3. Joint responsibility
In its efforts to bring about a change in its relations 
with them, the periphery generally invokes the 
moral responsibility of  the centres. But ethics is 
indivisible. And we are far from having recognized 
our own moral responsibility in face of the social 
unrest of  peripheral development. Nothing solid 
can be achieved without a joint acceptance of 
responsibilities.
Let us speak frankly: under the impulse of their 
hegemonic power, the centres cultivate their own 
immediate economic, political and diplomatic interests, 
but they are basically lacking in ability to take the 
long-term view, in farsighted concern for the future, 
in self-restraint in the exercise of their power.17
Want of  foresight with respect to energy 
resources has had dramatic consequences. Will this 
crisis teach people to think ahead in the exploitation 
and use of other natural resources?
Will the centres have learnt to set limits to their 
hegemonic power? Have they fully realized that 
this is essential if  their own interests are not to be 
doomed to suffer?
It is the reckless exercise of  that power and 
an inconceivable lack of foresight that have led to 
international monetary chaos.
Similar attitudes have also prevailed in relations 
with the periphery. Will there be nothing for it but 
to await a succession of crises before these attitudes 
undergo any change? Do the centres hope to weather 
the social storm that is brewing in the periphery?
All these vast and anxious questions, of 
profound world significance, are causing leaders 
perplexity and disquiet. And the ability to steer a 
course amid the tide of events seems to have been 
lost: that gifted leadership which has always been 
called for in the major vicissitudes of history.
What is to be done? Those who have the 
theoretical responsibility for shedding light on the 
path and discussing solutions can find no answer.18
The periphery’s responsibility is likewise 
immense. I do not believe, however, that we are as yet 
prepared to carry out a major task of transformation, 
whence the ultimate significance of  the present 
article. If  it succeeds in giving rise to discussion in 
depth, if  it leads to more searching examination of 
what the facts mean, and to consideration of how 
we ought to act on them in order to attain the major 
objectives of  development, it will have served the 
purpose for which it is intended.
Needless to say, this is not our business alone. 
The effort at enlightenment and persuasion must 
also be extended to those in the centres who are 
earnestly seeking a response to the problems of the 
world of today: a world very different from that of 
yesterday, by reason both of the great possibilities it 
offers and of the great risks it presents. Possibilities 
and risks alike we must confront without delay, 
undaunted by the image of the past. For upon us too 
a clear moral responsibility is laid by participation 
in this great human adventure of development; in 
the realm of thought at least, if  we can no longer 
play our part on the scene of action.
18 See a letter from K. Galbraith to the New York Times of  7 
May 1979.
17 Nothing important, nothing really constructive has been done 
since the developing countries began, two decades ago, to take 
a firm stand vis-à-vis the developed countries. The latter, with a 
few shining exceptions, have been at one in adopting negative 
attitudes.
It is understandable, therefore, that in the course of  my 
international experience I have been increasingly dominated by grave 
concern: concern at witnessing how events are running adrift.
